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INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the Commission of the European Communities (Commission) issued
the Green Paper "Mortgage Credit in the EU" (Green Paper). The Green Paper
initiated the process of assessing the merits of Commission intervention in the EU
residential mortgage credit markets. This assessment involved: (i) examining the
current condition of the mortgage market in the EU, (ii) soliciting feedback from
the Member States and stakeholders regarding the goals and questions the
Commission raised, and (iii) seeking the collection of further data. In 2007, the

Commission issued the White Paper "On the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit
Markets" (White Paper) which included a useful summary of the feedback
received and additional data collected; it also proposed certain changes to the
credit markets that the Commission is considering for a Directive.'

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., The Northwestern University
School of Law; B.A.., Brandeis University. Professor Stark thanks Dean John Corkery and
Associater Ralph Ruebner, both of the John Marshall School of Law, for their generous support
and Anne Abramson and Jamie Sommer, reference librarians at the School of Law, for their
excellent research assistance.
t Assistant Professor, Depaertment of Psychology, DePaul University; Ph.D. in Cognitive
Psychology, The University of California, Los Angeles; M.A. in Cognitive Psychology, The
University of California, Los Angeles; B.S. in Philosophy & Cognitive Science, The University
of California, Los Angeles.

1. A "Directive" is a legislative act of the EU initiated by the Commission and approved by
1
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This article initially analyzes and critiques the goals articulated by the
Commission in the White Paper, as well as certain of the consumer protection
initiatives they have proposed. As will be discussed, some of the goals the
Commission articulated are likely to work against each other. Moreover, many
may be unobtainable under the initiatives as currently proposed, in light of certain
cognitive phenomena that affect consumers when taking out home loans. With
these points in mind, this article employs a behavioral economics analysis which
indicates that the key consumer protection initiatives tentatively embraced by the
Commission represent a step in the right direction. However, there are additional
measures that any Directive the Commission issues must incorporate in order to
achieve the stated goal of enhancing consumer confidence and protection. These
additional measures are detailed and discussed in this article alongside the
measures the Commission tentatively endorsed.2
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE GOALS ARTICULATED BY THE COMMISSION

In the Green Paper, the Commission first focused on the current condition of
the EU mortgage credit market in order to determine what goals the Commission
should pursue with respect to this market. 3 The Commission noted that the EU
mortgage credit markets, despite sharing some common trends, remain very
diverse in terms of size, growth, product variety, borrower profiles, distribution
structures, loan durations, home ownership rates and funding mechanisms.
Accordingly, the level of direct cross-border sales is less than 1% of the overall
residential mortgage credit activity.4 The Commission also noted that, of the
markets in which consumers participate, the mortgage credit markets are among
the most complex.5 Consequently, this debt is likely to be the most significant ongoing financial commitment for most EU households, with the slightest change in
interest rates potentially having a significant effect on household budgets and
spending capacity.6 In light of this, the Commission's key goal was to increase the
efficiency and competitiveness of mortgage markets; doing so results in an
integration of markets, which ensures that mortgage credit can be demanded and

the European Parliament and Council requiring Member States to achieve certain results and
allowing the Member States to create national laws to achieve these results. See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 115, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010
http://eur114,
83)
(C
O.J.
[hereinafter
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF
TFEU].
2. The Commission noted that it was not yet ready to commit to any reforms for a new
Directive and wished to obtain further analysis and consultation with stakeholders before it would
make a final political assessment on the most appropriate way forward. Commission White Paper
on FinancialServices Policy 2005-2010, at 5, COM (2005) 619 final (Dec. 1, 2005), http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0629en01.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].
3. Commission Green Paper on Mortgage Credit in the EU, at 5, COM (2005) 327 final

(July 19, 2005) [hereinafter GreenPaper].
4. Green Paper,supra note 3, at 5.
5. Id. at 4.

6. Id.
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offered with limited hindrance throughout the EU.7 In 2005, the Commission
expressed an intent to: (i) decrease the costs of a mortgage loan; (ii) enhance
market completeness, product diversity, and price convergence; and (iii) create a
more liquid funding market based on modem and flexible funding techniques and
products that serve more borrowers (including those with poor and incomplete
credit ratings) through increased use of the capital markets and insurance.8
However, by the time the White Paper was issued in 2007, the goal of providing
funds to borrowers with poor credit ratings was de-emphasized in favor of prudent
lending standards, apparently due to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United
States.9
In analyzing the Commission's goals, it is interesting to note that "consumer
protection" is not identified as the key goal; instead it is listed as an area to work
on in order to achieve an integrated and efficient EU mortgage market. 0 One
reason for this may be that the EU mortgage markets in general, unlike the U.S.
market, did not have a thriving sub-prime market with divergent pricing. It was
this sub-prime market, coupled with a lack of consumer protection, that improperly
directed some consumers into a higher priced loan than for which they qualified."
Another reason may be that the EU generally required higher creditworthiness
standards12 than lenders in the United States for loans where the originating lenders
primarily sold off their mortgage loan pools after originating them, which had the
effect of protecting consumers. 3
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id at 3-6.
9. White Paper,supra note 2, at 3-4.
10. Green Paper,supra note 3, at 6.
11. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 135 (2003). Also heavily

contributing to home loans in the United States being overpriced was the fact that mortgage
brokers there would often be compensated based on a "yield spread premium" (compensation
based on inducing a borrower to enter into a higher priced loan than they qualified for) in which
only a small fraction of this payment would be applied to the borrower's closing costs. Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 73 Fed. Reg. 68,268 (Nov. 17, 2008) (citing to an
Urban Institute report in 2008 which found that paying one dollar of YSP to a mortgage broker
reduced upfront fees by only 7 cents). In contrast, mortgage broker compensation among the EU
Member States tends to be based on a fixed fee or percentage of the loan amount commission.
EUROPE ECONOMICS, DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES STUDY ON CREDIT
INTERMEDIARIES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 108 (2009).
12. Creditworthiness is a determination that borrowers have the means to afford making the
loan
payments.
See
Credit
Worthiness,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/Credit-Worthiness.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
13. As of 2005, about 34% of Americans owned their homes free and clear of any
mortgages.

Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime

Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). "Of those with mortgages, about three-quarters have
traditional fixed-rate mortgages, and about one-quarter of borrowers have adjustable rate
mortgages (about 16% of total homeowners)." Id "Most subprime loans were adjustable rate
mortgages, thus subprime loans comprise some subset of this 16% of all homeowners." Id.;
Preservingthe American Dream: PredatoryLending PracticesandHome Foreclosures: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (written
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Nevertheless, it is troubling that consumer protection is identified only as a
sub-goal to the Commission's primary objective of removing barriers to a more
integrated and efficient EU mortgage-market. The Commission's White Paper did
note some important consumer protection problems in the EU mortgage-market,
such as: (i) a lack of uniform pre-contractual information (in the form of a
European Standardized Information Sheet (ESIS1), which limited comparison
shopping by consumers;14 (ii) a lack of transparency with regard to both the
compensation of mortgage credit intermediaries15 and whether these intermediaries
are tied to a specific lender;16 (iii) restricted consumer mobility and decreased
competition resulting from tying the loan in with other products;17 (iv) a failure by
lenders to verify the borrower's creditworthiness (which may lead to a loss of their
homes);' 8 (v) borrowers taking on "unsuitable" loans; 19 and (vi) a lack of adequate
statement of Douglas G. Duncan, Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Association) [hereinafter
HearingBefore the S. Comm].
14. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 6; see also Accompanying the White Paper on the
Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets: Impact Assessment, at 13, SEC (2007) 1683 (Dec.

18,
2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia carriedout/docs/ia_2007/sec_2007_1683_en.pdf
[hereinafter Impact Assessment Annex 3] (noting that, for example, at the end of 2005,
institutions representing only 40% of the French mortgage market had subscribed to the voluntary
Code of Conduct that included a form of ESIS to be delivered to borrowers before they entered
into the home loan, with even fewer actually implementing it).
15. Mortgage credit intermediaries are independent mortgage brokers or agents of the
lender who assist borrowers in obtaining home loans. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note
14, at 82.
16. Id.; Summary of Responses to the Public Consultation on Responsible Lending and
at
available
30,
2009),
(Nov.
at
17
the
EU,
in
Borrowing

http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/finservicesretail/docs/credit/resplending/feedbacksummaryen.pdf [hereinafter Summary of Responses]
(noting that there was a conflict of interest in the compensation structure and need for greater
transparency in disclosing the mortgage brokers' commissions and fees).
17. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 82 ("Tying is particularly prevalent in
the European mortgage markets. For example, on average, 39% of new mortgage credits in the
EU have current accounts tied to them."). Tying is defined as selling two or more products
together in a package, when at least one of these products is not sold separately. Id. at 81; see
also White Paper,supra note 2, at 5.

18. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 36, 39-40. Although mortgage lenders
are generally expected to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer in the context of the
transaction envisaged, only some Member States require that lenders assess the creditworthiness
of a borrower. Id The report also noted that when lenders transfer their risks by issuing
mortgage backed securities or selling the loan portfolio, there is a risk the consumer might be
presented with a range of products that is not appropriate for the consumer. Id Eventually the
consumers may fail to meet their contractual obligations and lose their home. Id
19. Unsuitable loans are those that a borrower may be able to afford to pay back, but are
sub-optimal in light of the borrower's needs and goals. EUROPE ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at
126. See also id at iv (noting that "[t]he evidence we have collected suggests that the most
significant source of consumer detriment is the recommendation of products that are either
unsuitable to the borrower's personal circumstances or else are not price-competitive"). The
study then stated that the cause for this seemed to be systematic and stemming from the conflict
of interest when credit intermediaries are involved. Id The intermediaries putatively give expert
advice but have an incentive to provide advice that causes the borrower to take the loan so the
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financial literacy among EU consumers20 or information asymmetries that fail to
provide borrowers with adequate advice on the best loan for their purposes among
the variety of loan products being offered to them.21 In light of these problems,22
the Commission should have recognized consumer protection as a goal equivalent
in importance to its stated aim of creating a more integrated and efficient EU
market. The priority of goals is important here because it will direct the
Commission's decision making when it engages in a cost-benefit analysis of
different reform options, including consumer protection measures.
Furthermore, in the White Paper and its accompanying impact assessments,
the Commission articulated potentially inconsistent goals in aiming to "explore
ways through which greater product diversity can be combined with strong
consumer protection and adequate financial stability." 23 Problematically,
increasing the diversity of available loan products makes it more difficult for
consumers to understand and evaluate a particular product and select one that best
fits their circumstances.24 In order to pursue both goals, it may be necessary to
impose a "suitability" duty on mortgage lenders and intermediaries or a duty to
provide mandatory, independent advice (two measures the Commission has
considered but not embraced) before a consumer can choose a home loan product
that contains features that are different from a more "standard" form of prudent
home loan. The issue of contradictory goals and the need for further measures
than those currently endorsed by the Commission are discussed in Section III.
In the next section, this article analyzes the most fundamental reform measure
embraced by the Commission: 25 mandating that mortgage lenders (and possibly
intermediary can earn her commission. Id. at vi-v.
20. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 29 ("Numerous international surveys
have demonstrated a low level of understanding of financial matters on the part of consumers.
There is also a strong correlation between low levels of functional literacy and the ability to make
appropriate financial decisions.").
21. Id. at 37 (noting that 72% of the European consumers surveyed expected financial
institutions to give them advice on their home loans, but less than half of them trusted the advice
given.).
22. It is unfortunate that the Commission was presented with so little data on the extent of
these and other potential problems with the functioning of the mortgage market among the
Member States from the consumer's perspective. This would have been helpful in a more
complete cost/benefit analysis of various reform measures the Commission was considering, with
the notable exception of some data collected in the U.K. regarding inadequate consideration of
affordability and suitability by lenders in the sub-prime market there that the Commission noted.
23. White Paper,supranote 2, at 4.
24. See D.A. Lussier & R.W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in

Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 164-165 (1979) (finding that the choices consumers
make depend upon the difficulty of deciding between options such that when there are too many
options consumers make decisions based upon fewer product attributes); Lauren E. Willis,
Decision-Makingand the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L.

REv. 707, 780-81 (2006) (arguing that consumers primarily concentrate on monthly payment
when they make home loan decisions and often ignore other important product attributes).
25. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 28. The Commission compared the
various options and concluded that binding legislation mandating the disclosure of certain key
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credit intermediaries 26) present borrowers with certain standardized, precontractual information that outlines the basic terms of the loan, allowing the
borrower to compare this offer with other available options. Theoretically, this
information would empower consumers to take out loans that were the most
suitable for them (ones that meet their needs and goals), assuming they have the
background information necessary to know what they need and qualify for. For
some consumers then, this mandatory standardized information may be all they
need to make sound home loan decisions and to feel confident in their decisionmaking.27 However, as will be discussed in the next section, there are numerous
cognitive and social psychological phenomena that impede the effectiveness of this
pre-contractual information for many consumers.
III. A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S REVISED
MANDATORY ESIS

A.

The Revised ESIS

The Commission's White Paper is aimed at enhancing consumer confidence
in taking out a home loan from a cross-border lender. 28 The most fundamental
pre-contractual information would best provide consumers with accurate and timely information
and, in particular, was the only solution to ensure the comparability of the Annual Percentage
Rate of Charge. Id. In addition, the Commission initiated as a next step the creation of a revised
form of ESIS that would better inform consumers of the loan terms and facilitate price shopping.
Id; see also Green Paper,supra note 3 (noting that the Commission was not ready to create a
Directive with reform measures without first gathering more data and engaging in further

consultation with stakeholders). We believe that mandating that ESIS be supplied to consumers
before they enter into the loan is a reform that is likely to be included in a Directive. See Impact
Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 23 (A majority of the Member States voiced support for
the introduction of binding legislation to supply consumers with ESIS and supported the need for
a harmonized Annual Percentage Rate of Charge in terms of methodology used to calculate it and
the costs included in it (but with a majority supporting a narrow definition of cost)).
26. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 24 (stating that "[i]n principle, credit
intermediaries could also be subject to any binding information requirement. However, in the
light of the ongoing study, such a decision appears to be premature at this point in time.").
Because the study of credit intermediaries published in 2009 indicated, among other things, that
such intermediaries were not providing unbiased advice to borrowers due to a conflict of interest
resulting from commission based compensation, one would imagine that the Commission would
take this into account and apply the binding information requirement to them as well. See id.
27. See D.P. Stark & J.M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of
DisclosureLaws and Callfor Mortgage Counseling to Prevent PredatoryLending, 16 PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y, & L. 85, 90-96 (2010) (highlighting that consumers in the United States who took
out home loans at higher prices than they qualified for had the benefit of standardized precontractual information with a uniform APR calculation in the disclosure forms, but failed to use
the forms to effectively shop for the best loan they could qualify for). This was due, in part, to
being steered into overpriced loans by mortgage brokers seeking yield spread premiums, and who
took advantage of consumer cognitive and social psychological vulnerabilities. Id
28. See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 5 (the commission noted that this low level of
confidence is due in part to the different levels of consumer protection laws in effect among the

Member States-hence the need for more uniform consumer protection laws relating to precontractual information to be provided to consumers).
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measure the Commission preliminarily recommended was the creation of a
Directive mandating the use of a revised standardized form that provided home
loan borrowers with certain pre-contractual information. The mandatory precontractual information recommended by the EU Commission is a revised version
of the currently voluntary European Standardized Information Sheet (Revised
ESIS) tested and reported on in 2009. The purpose of this section is to apply a
psychological analysis and critique of the Revised ESIS similar to the analysis and
critique that the authors engaged in of U.S. home disclosure forms (Psychological
Analysis of U.S. Disclosures).29
The Psychological Analysis of U.S. Disclosures considered fourteen
psychological phenomena that can create barriers to a consumer's reading and
comprehension of the information presented on disclosure forms. 30 It also critiqued
these forms on the basis of how well they are able to overcome these barriers.
The fourteen psychological phenomena, described in more detail below, are: (1)
the consumers' inability to process user-unfriendly features of disclosure forms;
(2) consumers' lack of contractual schemas or knowledge structures; (3) inaccurate
default assumptions of how contractual provisions are likely to be structured and
whether the contract is negotiable; (4) availability heuristics; (5) reason-based
decision making; (6) biases in attribute estimation and evaluation; (7) confirmation
biases; (8) consumers' acceptance of senseless explanations; (9) argument
immunization; (10) sunk cost effects; (11) endowment effects; (12) temporal and
uncertainty discounting; (13) strong motivations to trust; and (14) social norms and
signals. The underlying reason why many of these phenomena impede consumers'
abilities to read and comprehend disclosure forms is a psychological phenomenon
known as information overload; that is, there is a limit to how much information
consumers can process.32 At the same time, there is a lot of information that
consumers need to know in order to make sound home-loan decisions, and so they
rely upon heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, to make these decisions. 33 Our aim in
this section is to analyze how well the Revised ESIS is able to overcome the
barriers presented by these fourteen psychological phenomena.
In our judgment, the information presented on the Revised ESIS is generally
easier for consumers to understand than the information presented in the U.S.
Housing and Urban Development's HUD-1 disclosure form, the Good Faith
Estimate of Closing Costs form (GFE), or the Federal Reserve's Truth-In-LendingAct (TILA) form, all of which are currently used in the United States.34 The
29. See generally Stark & Choplin, supra note 27.
30. Id. at 97-105.
31. Id. at 105-113.
32. See generally Naresh K. Malhortra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm
in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436 (1984).
33. See generally id
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUStNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: SETTLEMENT STATEMENT
(2008), http://archives.hud.gov/news/2008/hud-1.pdf [hereinafter HUD-1 Form]; U.S. DEP'T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE (GFE) (2008),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rnra/res/gfestimate.pdf; Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 75 Fed.
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Revised ESIS is more comparable with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's
(FTC) proposed form because the Revised ESIS includes short explanations of
many line items, such as "Loan Description" and "Early Repayment," for less
sophisticated consumers.3 1 It therefore surpasses its American counterparts with
regard to the first psychological phenomenon, which is a consumer's inability to
process user-unfriendly features of disclosure forms.
Consistent with our assessment, the majority of consumers who participated
in qualitative testing of the Revised ESIS form 6 did not feel overwhelmed by the
amount of information presented on the form, did not suffer from information
overload, and felt that the form was largely written in plain language." The
Revised ESIS form also defines much of the language that financially less
sophisticated consumers may not understand (such as "repayment home loan" and
"recurrent" and "non-recurrent" costs). 38 By contrast, the HUD- 1 form does not
define financially sophisticated terms like "origination charge," "balloon
payment," and "prepayment penalty."3 9
However, the Revised ESIS does leave other vitally important terms
undefined (such as "nominal interest rate" and "APRC"). It is critical that these
terms should also be clearly defined and explained. In particular, we recommend
that the costs to be included in the APRC calculation (a matter about which the
Commission is seeking feedback) should be broadly based, including all costs to
obtain the loan, rather than narrowly based. This should include only direct lender
charges, as the lending industry desires, so that consumers will be able to compare
the total price of two or more loans. 40
One important example of how the Revised ESIS is more user-friendly than
American disclosure forms concerns the consumer's right to prepay the loan and
what charges, if any, the lender will impose in that circumstance. This is a critical
and often misunderstood loan term. In the Revised ESIS' section on Early
Repayment, consumers are told in plain language that they may repay the loan
early, and all the potential exit charges triggered by early repayment are clearly
enumerated. 4 1 Although well done, this section of the Revised ESIS could be
Reg. 7794 (2010).
35. For a discussion of why the proposed FTC form is easier for less financially
sophisticated consumers to follow than HUD- 1 and TILA, see Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at
112.
36. European Standardized Information Sheet, in EUROPEAN AGREEMENT ON A
VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT ON PRE-CONTRACTUAL INFORMATION FOR HOME LOANS 7,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/agreement-en.pdf
[hereinafter Revised ESIS Form].
37. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CONSUMER TESTING OF POSSIBLE NEW FORMAT AND
CONTENT FOR THE ESIS ON HOME LOANS, PHASE 1 (2009) (hereinafter ESIS CONSUMER
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/esispresentationTESTING),
2009_05_13_en.pdf.
38. Revised ESIS Form, supra note 36, at 5-7.
39. HUD-1 Form, supra note 34, at 3.
40. The Commission has yet to take a position on whether to calculate the APRC on a broad
or a narrow basis.
41. See Revised ESIS Form, supra note 36, at 5-7.
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further improved to address psychological phenomenon number four (the
availability heuristics, 42 discussed in more detail below) by presenting in plain
language all the conditions that would trigger a non-voluntary early repayment of
the loan, such as default or the sale of the home. However, this must be balanced
with the goal of avoiding information overload. Although some discussion group
participants who pre-tested the Revised ESIS had difficulties with this section, it is
nevertheless easier for financially less sophisticated consumers to understand than
the forms currently used in the United States.43
The HUD-1, for example, simply asks "Does your loan have a prepayment
penalty?" and presents checkboxes for "No" and "Yes."" If "Yes" is checked, it
then presents the maximum prepayment penalty. 45 There are several problems with
this American approach, starting with the fact that financially less sophisticated
consumers may not know what a "prepayment penalty" is. Prepayment charges
are any fees associated with paying off the loan prior to its maturity date.4 6 They
could potentially misconstrue it as a penalty for turning in a monthly payment
early. Furthermore, presenting the maximum penalty, although important in
preventing lenders from hiding it, fails to provide consumers a clear understanding
of the conditions under which prepayment penalties or early repayment fees can be
charged, as does the Revised ESIS form.
The Revised ESIS form does well on this score, despite the fact that some of
the focus group participants who reviewed the ESIS were still confused by this
section.47 In fact, it is unsurprising that, despite the plain language of the Revised
ESIS, some consumers will continue to have difficulties considering all of the
scenarios under which early repayment might be possible for them. Consumers
judge the likelihood of events based upon the ease of recalling or imagining such
scenarios, (the "availability heuristic") and might not be able to recall or imagine
all relevant scenarios. Furthermore, it is also possible that no disclosure form will
be able to fully educate financially less sophisticated consumers about everything
they need to know. For this reason, in Section III we advocate mortgage
counseling by independent third parties for financially less sophisticated
consumers before they take on very risky loans.
While the Revised ESIS is generally more user-friendly and helpful to
consumers than the American disclosure forms, there remains room for
improvement. The form should alert consumers to how high their monthly
payments could rise under an adjustable rate loan, which the revised American

42. A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability,4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 163, 207-32 (1980).
43. ESIS CONSUMER TESTING, supra note 37.
44. HUD-I Form, supra note 34, at 3.

45. Id
46. Prepayment

Penalty,

INVESTOPEDIA,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prepaymentpenalty.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
47. ESIS CONSUMER TESTING, supra note 37, at 34.
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disclosure forms already do.48 The Illustrative Repayment Table in ESIS is
particularly problematic because, with only that information, consumers have no
idea how their actual repayment schedule might differ from the illustrative one. As
a result, consumers may be unable to determine whether they can truly afford a
loan in the long run. By contrast, the HUD-1 used in the United States specifies
the maximum rate and maximum monthly payment amount to which a loan can
adjust. 4 9 The Revised ESIS should do so as well. Other than this flaw, the
demonstration amortization schedule format used by the Revised ESIS can be
useful for calculations during the period before interest rates start to adjust.5 0 The
plain language used by the ESIS to explain whether or not a loan has an adjustable
rate, rather than the checkbox format used by the HUD-1, is also a helpful feature
for consumers.
It must be noted that one of the strengths of the Revised ESIS may also have
potential downsides. As described above, consumers do not report that it leads to
information overload. However, this may be because the Revised ESIS form does
not include an itemization of all costs and charges incident to obtaining the loan,
nor does it contain certain other information previously noted.5 Just like the GFE,
HUD-1, and TILA forms currently used in the United States, the Revised ESIS
presents the loan amount, the interest rate and the APRC, the duration of the home
loan agreement, and the number and frequency of payments. 52 The Revised ESIS
does not, however, list a number of fees that are included in the American forms,
which reflect charges payable to third parties. These fees include government
recording or registration fees for filing the deed and mortgage, real estate broker
fees (if the loan is for a purchase rather than a refinance), appraisal fees (to
appraise the value of the home), and flood certification fees (to certify that the
home is not in a flood plain - perhaps because some or all of these fees do not
apply as they do in the United States).53 Moreover, fees resulting from a lender or
credit intermediary (such as origination charges, tax service fees,54 fees to a credit
intermediary, or any other form of compensation an intermediary receives beyond
the lender's interest rate) are also listed on the Revised ESIS form. 5 Fortunately,
the Revised ESIS reserves a section for the listing of all additional costs; we
presume this section will include all of these charges. However, this requirement
should be made clear in any Directive relating to the imposition of the Revised
ESIS, so there will be no hidden fees or charges in connection with obtaining the
loan. 6
48. HUD-t Form, supra note 34, at 3.
49. Id.
50. Revised ESIS Form, supranote 36, at 5-7.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. HUD-1 Form, supra note 34, at 2-3.
54. It is surprising that there was no mention in the form of origination charges. One
possible explanation might be that lenders do not charge them in Europe or it is included in the
interest charges or otherwise included in some other charge.
55. Revised ESIS Form, supra note 36, at 6.
56. A tax service fee could apply if the lender requires the borrower to deposit with the
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While the American forms enumerate and disclose these types of commonly
imposed lender charges, certain lender/mortgage broker charges are not well
explained. Some have criticized the United States' HUD-1 for failing to
adequately disclose and explain the presence of a "yield spread premium" (an
amount that credit intermediaries receive from lenders for inducing consumers to
57
select higher priced loans than they otherwise would have qualified for). This is
an especially problematic hidden charge, as it places credit intermediaries'
financial interests in conflict with those of consumers. This lack of transparent
disclosure of these charges in the GFE and HUD-1 forms fails to inform
consumers that they may be receiving a higher priced loan than they are qualified
for. It also fails to clearly depict to what extent, if any, this payment to the
mortgage broker was applied by the broker to reduce the borrower's closing
costs.58
Based upon information in the White Paper, it appears that yield spread
premiums are not currently an issue for European consumers, because they are not
used in the European Union as frequently as they are in the United States (except
59
in countries like Great Britain, which at one time had a sub-prime market).
However, if yield spread premiums gain popularity in the European Union, those
charges should be required to be listed and explained, which might cause European
consumers to seek out lower cost loans. Some may argue that yield spread
premiums are not a fee or charge paid by the borrower, but rather payments from
the lender to the credit intermediary; nevertheless, consumers must be made aware
of such payments so that they will be better positioned to distinguish between their
own interests and those of credit intermediaries.
Additionally, although it does not directly affect the price of a loan,
consumers should be notified of any deposits required to be given to the lender in
advance of any home ownership costs, such as home owner's insurance or property
taxes. There is currently no place in the Revised ESIS calling for information on
required deposits to be disclosed in advance. Consumers should be made aware of
these issues in the Revised ESIS, as they might want to shop for a loan that would
60
allow them to make these payments as they become due, rather than in advance.
lender in escrow monies to pay real estate taxes and the lender then charges a fee to make
periodic real estate tax payments on the mortgaged property.
57. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 97.
58. Id. at 92 n. 21 (indicating that according to one study, only seven cents per dollar of
YSP was applied to the borrower's closing costs).
59. White Paper,supranote 2, at 10.

60. The required deposits tie up the consumer's money without the consumer receiving
interest on the funds deposited; if the lender fails to make payment of taxes and insurance, the
consumer will have to expend time and effort to correct this. While required deposits should be
noted in the Revised ESIS, we do not recommend that they be included in the calculation of total
closing charges as in the HUD-1. The HUD- l's treatment makes it difficult to easily compare
true closing charges among more than one loan because some lenders require deposits and others
do not. See generally HUD- I Form, supra note 34. The deposits are not true closing charges to
obtain a loan because the consumer will need to pay real estate taxes or insurance (two typical
deposit requirements) as an owner of real estate, even if the lender does not seek a deposit for
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Another problematic issue in the European Union concerns "tie-ins," a
mechanism through which lenders require borrowers to accept other services from
the lender, such as keeping a bank account with the lender, as a condition of the
mortgage. This practice, which is prohibited in the United States, may amount to a
hidden cost of taking out a loan. Such tie-ins (if still lawful) should be included
and detailed in the Revised ESIS so their cost may be factored into the price of the
loan and thus, allow for consumer comparison.
In summary, the Revised ESIS is a critical first step in empowering
consumers to make sound home loan decisions because it creates a relatively welldesigned mandatory uniform information statement. This statement would include
a standardized annual percentage rate charge (APRC), calculated uniformly among
Member States, and would be provided before the consumer enters into the loan.
Inclusion of this charge enables comparison shopping, making it both necessary
and essential to the Commission's goal of enhancing consumer confidence among
those who take out cross-border home loans.
Assuming the Revised ESIS is modified as recommended in this Section, it
will enable consumers with only a minimum level of prior financial literacy to
make a side-by-side comparison of a loan from a lender in one Member State with
a loan from a lender in another Member State. The Revised ESIS, with the
changes we recommend, would create a physical schema6 1 for the loan terms that
would enhance consumer financial literacy and better enable EU consumers to
compare loans from across the entire EU.
Although the Revised ESIS disclosure form does a good job of balancing the
goals of providing borrowers with all necessary information, being user-friendly,
and avoiding information overload, a number of psychological barriers remain.
The remainder of Section II will focus on these.
B.

Psychological Barriers Affecting Consumers' Comprehension of Mortgage
Instruments

Even the best information forms leave financially less-sophisticated
Inevitably, certain
consumers vulnerable to home loan contract schemes.
unsophisticated consumers will still lack the requisite background knowledge to
comprehend how loans work (psychological phenomenon number two). As such,
they might need further education about the process before they can make sound
loan decisions.62 Furthermore, some consumers will have inaccurate assumptions
this. It is an expense either way.
61. This addresses psychological phenomenon number two, which is discussed supra Part
11I.A, para. 2 and infra text accompanying notes I1S, 130.
62. While financial literacy programs during elementary and secondary school are helpful
and necessary, financial educators have noted that individuals are most receptive to learning when
they are most in need of the information provided. See Barbara O'Neill, Avoiding Predatory
Loans: Is Financial Education the Solution?, Speech at the John Marshall Law School
Symposium (May 18, 2003) (outline of the speech on file with the author). Consequently,
consumers can potentially learn the most by receiving important background information while in
the process of seeking a home loan, through such information in disclosure forms themselves or
through a one-on-one session with a mortgage counselor. Id. (emphasizing that the best learning
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of how loans are structured (psychological phenomenon number three), perhaps
because they have successfully taken out loans in the past and assume the structure
of their current loan mirrors their previous ones. These false default assumptions
may cause consumers to pay less attention to disclosure forms or incorrectly
assume that mortgage loans are contracts of adhesion and cannot be negotiated,63
leaving them with no incentive to comparison shop.64
As mentioned above in the Early Repayment section, consumers may also
misjudge the likelihood of events related to the loan (for example, that they will
need to sell the house or otherwise be in a position to repay the loan early, that the
loan payments will adjust, or that they will encounter financial difficulties).65 This
is because people judge the likelihood of an event based on how easily certain
circumstances come to mind (called the "availability heuristic," psychological
phenomenon number four). Although the ESIS may indicate that a loan is
adjustable, for example, the consumer may not accurately evaluate the likelihood
of a large upward adjustment.
Because the large amount of information consumers must process in
reviewing disclosure forms exceeds their working memory capacity, consumers
often try to simplify decisions by myopically justifying a choice at the expense of
all other features of the home loan. 66 This phenomenon is called "reason-based
decision-making" (psychological phenomenon number five).67 In the case of home
loans, consumers' justification is often that the initial monthly payment was
affordable.68 Many consumers then ignore or give relatively little weight to other
features of the loan. This decision making strategy may cause consumers to
neglect problematic features of the loan, even if they are listed on the disclosure
form. As such, merely presenting a value on a disclosure form does not
necessarily ensure that consumers will understand what it means.69
In fact, cognitive psychologists have identified many factors that can
influence consumers' evaluation, comprehension, and estimation of attribute
occurs not in the classroom but at "teachable moments," such as when a person is in financial
distress, through "active" learning (learning by doing), learning from experience, and one-on-one
learning).
63. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, European Fair Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive, 35 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 305, 305 (2007) (noting that "most consumer
transactions result in contracts of adhesion where all but the most basic terms are neither read by
the consumer nor negotiable," after discussing the widely criticized "consent model" of contracts
as not reflecting what happens in a typical merchant-consumer transaction).
64. H. Beales, et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 14
(1981).
65. See text accompanying notes 40-43.
66. See generally Eldar Shafir, et at., Reason-BasedChoice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Lauren E. Willis, Decision-Making and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
PredatoryLending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 780-81 (2006).
69. C.K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals
Between Joint and Separate Evaluation of Alternatives, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 247, 255 (1996).
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values (psychological phenomenon number six). One such factor is the "status
quo" or "default value" bias, under which consumers may accept disadvantageous
terms to which they have become accustomed, such as a prior high interest rate
loan. 70 Another factor is framing effects, under which the description of a term
affects an individual's evaluation of it. For example, if a lender or credit
intermediary said, "in the first few years of your loan, the proportion of your
monthly payment of interest will be higher than in later years," it frames the early
proportion of interest as a loss to the consumer, notwithstanding any tax benefits.
By contrast, saying, "after the first few years of your loan, the proportion of your
monthly payment paying for interest is lower than at the start," frames the later
71
portion as a gain to the consumer.
Another factor is "range effects," under which an unreasonable term appears
more reasonable if even more unreasonable terms have been offered (such as a

mortgage broker telling the consumer that some other lender would require six
months of interest for early repayment, whereas he only requires five). 72 The range
effect can be enhanced by presenting numerous decoy values designed to make the
unreasonable term look more reasonable. For example, the tender in the
preceding example might list examples of several other banks' charges, all higher
than his banks charge.
Still another factor is verbal comparisons, under which language-based
comparisons (such as, "the interest rate we are offering you is better than the
interest rate other lenders would offer you") to other terms can affect how
reasonable the consumer judges the to-be-evaluated term (that is, making the
interest rate the lender is offering seem more reasonable). 74 Finally, anchoring
effects can affect estimates of unknown values. Under these effects, when a
person hears an arbitrary number, his estimate of the number will be biased
towards the arbitrary number. For example, if the consumer hears that the average
probability of needing to repay a loan early is two percent, his estimate of his own
probability will be biased toward this number, even if in actuality it is much
higher. These biases may prevent consumers from recognizing how problematic
home-loan terms are, even if they see those terms presented on the disclosure form
and succeed in reading the form.
70. H. HELSON, ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY (1964); D. Kahneman & A. Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 286 (1979).
71. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 454 (1981).
72. The range is the highest and lowest values seen by the consumer. J. Volkmann, Scales
ofJudgment and Their Implicationsfor Social Psychology, in Soc. PSYCH. AT THE CROSSROADS
279-94 (J. H. Roherer & M. Sherif eds.,1951); A. Parducci, Category Judgments: A RangeFrequency Model, 72 PSYCHOL. REV. 407 (1965).
73. Parducci, supra note 72.
74. J. M. Choplin & J. E. Hummel, Magnitude Comparisons Distort Mental
Representationsof Magnitude, 131 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 270, 286 (2002); J. M. Choplin
& J. E. Hummel, Comparison-Induced Decoy Effects, 33 MEMORY & COGNITION 332, 343
(2005).
75. A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1126 (1974).
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The Commission, like its American counterparts, failed to consider that the
manner in which lenders or credit intermediaries present the Revised ESIS to
This issue is particularly relevant for
consumers impedes its usefulness.
psychological phenomena seven ("confirmation bias"), eight ("acceptance of
senseless explanations"), and nine ("argument immunization"). A confirmation
bias is a tendency to test whether lenders are telling the truth by seeking
information that would confirm what they say, rather than seeking information that
would disconfirm what they say. This phenomenon has been demonstrated in
many cognitive psychological studies.76 Consumers may, therefore, examine the
ESIS for information confirming, rather than disconfirming what lenders and credit
intermediaries told them about the loan. For example, one might look at the
repayment schedule presented in Section 7 to confirm that the intermediary quoted
them an accurate initial monthly payment, but fail to see the degree to which the
loan adjusts and the maximum to which it could rise, despite the fact that the ESIS
form repeatedly states this information.
Consumers will often accept irrational explanations, as long as the syntax of
the explanation is provided (psychological phenomenon number eight).n As a
result, unscrupulous lenders or intermediaries may be able to conceal problematic
terms in the ESIS. For example, if a consumer is told that a loan has a fixed rate,
but then discovers on the ESIS form that it will adjust after five years, an
unscrupulous lender or intermediary might explain the consumer's concern away
by saying something senseless such as, "Five years at a fixed rate is a 'fixed rate
loan,' it has to adjust after that point because market interest rates will be sure to
adjust downward by that time." Consumers have been shown to be vulnerable to
such implausible responses when they take on the syntax of an explanation.
Likewise, unscrupulous intermediaries may be able to preempt the discovery
of a problematic term using a phenomenon called "argument immunization"
(psychological phenomenon number nine)79 under which they give consumers a
sense that something could be "misinterpreted," and then immediately demonstrate
that such an interpretation would be inaccurate.80 After that, consumers will be less
76. P.C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129 (1960); J. Klayman & Y.W. Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation,
and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 216 (1987).
77. E. J. Langer, et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The Role of
"Placebic"Information in InterpersonalInteraction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635,

637-38 (1978). The study investigated the effectiveness of explanations in convincing people to
comply with requests in an experiment where the experimenter asked to butt in line to make
photocopies. They found that even senseless explanations (e.g., "May I use the Xerox machine,
because I have to make copies?") were effective in getting compliance. Id
78. See Choplin & Stark, An Empirical Investigation of Consumer Deception Through
Explanation Scripts: Legal & Policy Implications (2010) (on file with authors).

79. Stark & Choplin, supranote 27, at 97.
80. William J. McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion Conferred by Active and Passive Prior
Refutation of the Same and Alternative Counterarguments, 63 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOCIAL

PSYCHOL. 326, 329-31 (1961); William J. McGuire & Demetrious Papageorgias, The Relative
Efficacy of Various Types of PriorBelief-Defense in ProducingImmunity Against Persuasion. 62
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likely to believe the so-called "misinterpretation," even if the ESIS makes it
patently obvious that this interpretation is the correct one.8 ' For example, an
unscrupulous intermediary might immunize consumers against discovering how
problematic early repayment fees are by telling them, before they ever see the
ESIS form, that there are certain provisions in the form that only apply to rich
people, such as the early repayment section. A consumer might then skip over this
section when they read over the ESIS form on the assumption that it does not apply
to them.
Even the best loan information forms cannot prevent many consumers from
being induced to make unwise home loan decisions when lenders and
intermediaries take advantage of these three psychological phenomena - number
seven (confirmation bias), number eight (acceptance of senseless explanations),
and number 9 (argument immunization); for this reason, additional protections
82
should be provided to consumers.
We suggest imposing duties of suitability on the mortgage lender and
intermediary and/or requiring advice from an independent third party, especially
when the borrower is entering into a non-standard loan product or a risky loan
product.83 These recommendations would also help consumers overcome the
instances of information overload represented by the first six psychological
phenomena.
One key feature that must be considered when assessing the potential
effectiveness of the Revised ESIS form is the time at which the form is required to
be presented to the consumer. This is due to the influence of a phenomenon called
"sunk costs" (psychological phenomenon number ten), where consumers are
willing to sink more resources toward attaining a goal than they initially
84
anticipated because they have already spent resources to attain that goal). The
Commission has failed to specify precisely when the Revised ESIS should be
provided to the consumer. However, it did indicate that the consumer should
receive the Revised ESIS in time to do comparison shopping of the loan and often
referred to the disclosure form as "pre-contractual information."85 Thus, the form
would need to be delivered to the borrower some time before the consumer has
committed to the loan.86 The "sunk costs" phenomenon suggests that the form

J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 327, 332-35 (1961).
81. McGuire & Papageorgias, supra note 80, at 332-35.
82. Stark & Choplin,, supra note 27, at 97; see also infra Part III.
83. Among the additional measures we recommend in Section III is for the Commission to
create, after consultation with the mortgage lending industry, consumer representatives, and other
stakeholders, a risk based classification of loan products and a standard form of prudent home
loan. See infra Part III.
84. Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 97; Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The
Psychology ofSunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. AND HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124-25 (1985);
Hal R. Arkes & Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost
Effect, 13 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 295, 295 (2000).
85. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 6.
86. Id. The Commission also stated, somewhat confusingly, that the information should be

provided "sufficiently before the conclusion of the contract." Id. It would be clearer to state:
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should be presented to consumers early, certainly before consumers invest
financial resources into pursuing the loan and, preferably, before they invest time
and effort.8 7
However, even that might not be early enough due to the influence of a
phenomenon called "endowment effects" (psychological phenomenon number
eleven) where consumers overvalue objects-such as a home-that they have
started to think of as their own.88 This makes consumers willing to spend much
more money than they initially anticipated in order to avoid losing what they
consider to be theirs. 89 This phenomenon makes consumers overvalue the home
and undervalue the costs and risks associated with the loan. 90 These effects can
begin as soon as consumers think of the house as their possession and imagine
their daily lives in the house. 91 Once consumers feel that the house belongs to
them, then owning the house will seem the status quo and losing it will seem a
loss. Therefore, we recommend that consumers should receive the ESIS Statement
as early in the process of purchasing the home as possible.
Consumers also have a tendency to ignore or discount delayed and uncertain
charges; this is called "temporal discounting" (psychological phenomenon number
twelve).92 Consequently, consumers will not be dissuaded by problematic costs and
fees if such fees can be paid at a later date.9 3 For example, consumers might be
concerned about a loan that has a fixed rate for the first five years, but then
afterwards adjusts, because they perceive five years to be in the distant future.
Likewise, they might not be concerned about early repayment fees, because the
probability of early repayment seems low and is also in the distant future.
Consumers also have a tendency to trust lenders and credit intermediaries on

"before entering into the contract." Id.
87. In the United States, there are two stages in the process of applying for and obtaining
home loans at which lenders are required to disclose loan terms. More Information about
RESPA, HUD.GOV, http://hud.gov/offices/hsg/ramh/res/respamor.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
The first stage is early in the application process, at which time lenders are required to give
consumers two disclosure forms: the Good Faith Estimate ("GFE") and the Mortgage Servicing
Disclosure Statement. Id. At the second stage, when the loan is funded, consumers receive the
HUD-1 disclosure form showing actual closing costs. Id. The HUD-1 statement includes
comparisons with the estimated charges in the GFE and laws that prohibit increases in these
figures beyond certain tolerances. It appears that there is not a second stage disclosure
contemplated for the EU and just the Revised ESIS at the front end of the home loan process
which we assume-but the Directive should clarify-will not change at the time of the funding of

the loan. Id.
88. Id.
89. Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Cause
Theorem, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1325, 1326-29 (1990).
90. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies:Tbe Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 51 J.ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (discussing asymmetrical valuing generally).
9 1. Id
92. Sara J. Estle et al., Differential Effects of Amount on Temporal and Probability
Discountingof Gains and Losses, 34 MEMORY & COGNITION 914, 914 (2006).

93. Id
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whom they are dependent (psychological phenomenon number thirteen).94 The
reason for this misplaced trust stems from a reciprocity effect.95 Consumers may
trust the lenders and credit intermediaries who "give" them loans because the
consumers perceive that the lenders and credit intermediaries "trust" the consumers
to pay back the loans. The framing of loans as "gifts" may be partially responsible
for this effect. 96 Lenders and credit intermediaries are not "selling" loans or
"putting loans on the market" and consumers are not "buying" loans. Rather
lenders and credit intermediaries are "giving" loans and consumers are "taking"
loans. Consumers perceive that, because the lenders and credit intermediaries are
kindly giving a loan and trusting the consumer, it is incumbent upon consumers to
also trust those lenders and credit intermediaries.9 7 This reciprocity rule may be
particularly strong among consumers who were historically considered to have a
lower status (i.e., people with low socio-economic status, ethnic minorities, young
people, and women), and who are only likely to distrust when they fear an unequal
outcome.9 8 A simple form such as the ESIS cannot correct this false framing of a
reciprocal relationship. Furthermore, no matter how thorough a disclosure form
may be, consumers will be vulnerable to social norms and signals that
communicate that it is not necessary to carefully read the ESIS form
(psychological phenomenon number fourteen). 99 Consumers commonly sign
documents without scrutiny when prompted to do so.100 The representative
presenting the form simply tells consumers, "sign here," pointing to the line where
they are to sign, and they sign. 01 They do so partly in response to the social signal
that they are expected to sign immediately.' 02
An example of how the social situation can signal that people are expected to
sign documents without scrutiny is that title companies in the United States usually
only schedule one or two hours for a home loan closing.' 0 3 Much of that time is
devoted to simply waiting for the lender to authorize funding, yet it would take
many more hours to actually read through the combined acquisition and loan
documents.i' Similarly, European consumers may accept the terms of home loans
94. J. Mark Weberet al., Normal Acts of IrrationalTrust: Motivated Attributions and the
Trust Development Process, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 75, 80-81 (Barry
Staw & Roger Kramer, eds., 2005).
95. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 31 (rev. ed.
2007).
96. Id. at 17-18.
97. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE, supra note 95, at 17-18.
98. See Kessely Hong & Iris Bohnet, Status and Distrust: The Relevance of Inequality and
Betrayal Aversion, J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 197, 207 (2007) (stating that people with lower economic
status have a strong aversion to loss).
99. Stark & Choplin,, supranote 27, at 97.
100. D.P. Stark, & J.M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths
Despite ConsumerPsychologicalRealities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617, 707-8 (2009).

101. Id
102. Id
103. Id.
104. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 104-05; see also Castellana v. Conyers Toyota,

Inc., 407 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Ga. App. 1991) (stating that it took the consumer two hours and forty-

HeinOnline -- 25 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 18 2011

2011]

CONSUMER PROTECTION INITIATIVES

19

without reading the ESIS carefully simply because social norms and signals
communicate that they are expected to do so. Stark and Choplin found this effect
among study participants in the U.S., but we have not yet studied how participants
among the various Member States may behave.' 05
While psychological barriers ten and eleven relating to sunk costs and the
endowment effect are very difficult to overcome, the additional reforms we
propose in Section III should help to some extent. These reforms should also be
highly effective in addressing barriers twelve, thirteen, and fourteen ("temporal
and certainty discounting," "misplaced trust," and "social norms not to carefully
read before signing")' 06 as well as the information overload type barriers one
through nine. 0 7 We discuss how the reforms proposed can address all fourteen
psychological barriers in Section III.
Thus, while mandating the revised ESIS that includes a uniformly calculated
APRC is a critical first step to empowering consumers, the 14 psychological
barriers presented above suggest that doing so alone is inadequate and needs to be
supplemented with other consumer protection measures. One additional measure
that the Commission did appear to endorse is related to whether the borrower has
the ability to repay the debt (i.e., whether the borrower was "creditworthy").' 08 The
Commission indicated that it favored mandating that lenders (and possibly
intermediaries as well) determine the creditworthiness of a borrower before
offering the loan to the borrower and the creation of standards that have to be met
if advice is given.' 09 However, the Commission did not embrace other possible
measures (the first three of which they noted as possible reforms): (i) creating risk
guidelines for home loans, (ii) imposing a duty on lenders and mortgage brokers to
ensure that the loan was suitable, (iii) requiring mandatory advice on home loans,
and (iv) creating a standard form of home loan product. These reform ideas,
modified to address some of the concerns about them noted by the Commission
and to take into account the psychological phenomena noted in Section II, are
discussed in detail in Section III.
five minutes to read the acquisition and finance documents in the context of the purchase of an
automobile). It took a research assistance of one co-author of this article, who happened to be a
mortgage broker, over two hours just to speed-read through the loan documents that included
terms even he did not understand, nor did he pause to ponder, in that time frame.
105. Stark & Choplin, A License to Deceive, supra note 100, at 707-08.
106. Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 97.
107. Id.
108. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 36, 44.
109. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 44 (where it is stated under
objectives: "it should be ensured that: mortgage lenders, and intermediaries where appropriate,
sufficiently assess the creditworthiness of a borrower; consumers have access to objective advice
which is based on the profile of the customer and commensurate with the complexity of the
products and the risks involved"). Id. Impact Assessment Annex 3 concludes that the best
strategy for meeting the above is via legislation obliging mortgage lenders to assess consumer
creditworthiness (option 4) and development of high level standards for the provision of advice
obliging Member States to ensure that it is provided according to those standards (option 4.3). Id
at 54.
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IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION MEASURES THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD
RECONSIDER AND INCLUDE INITS DIRECTIVE
Because of the cognitive and social psychological barriers discussed in
Section II, we recommend the Commission endorse and begin developing four
additional reform measures for a future Directive on the residential mortgage
market in the EU.
The first such measure would be mandating the creation of a "risk-based
classification" (from the borrower's perspective) of the loan products being offered
in the EU market."o The Commission had sought feedback on such topics as
creating "risk guidelines" and encouraging responsible borrowing."' The Financial
sector trade unions recommended assisting consumers' borrowing decisions via the
establishment of risk classifications of credit products;"l2 we believe such
classifications would be more helpful to consumers than creating only risk
guidelines. Simply presenting consumers with a set of guidelines on the riskiness
of different loan features could very well lead to information overload, as some
consumer advocates have asserted." 3 However, the creation of a risk-based
classification of loan products is different; the consumer would receive a simple
"rating" of the safety or risk of the loan being offered. This rating could take the
form of the following types of classifications: 1. Very Safe, 2. Safe, 3. Risky, and
4.Very Risky.
This rating system should be highly useful to consumers in overcoming the
various cognitive barriers to decision-making previously discussed. It would
mitigate the effects of psychological phenomenon number one, consumers'
inability to process user-unfriendly features of disclosure forms, because a single
classification would summarize various features and thereby alleviate cognitive
overload. 14 It would mitigate psychological phenomenon number two, consumers'
lack of contractual schemas or knowledge structures, because even if consumers
are unable to judge the riskiness of a loan, they will understand the meaning of
these classifications."' It might overcome psychological phenomenon number
five, reason-based decision-making, if consumers considered this feature as
seriously as they do their potential monthly payment." 6 It would very likely also
help reduce psychological phenomenon number six, biases in attribute estimation
and evaluation, since this classification summarizes a variety of other features,
which then would not require separate evaluations of each one to come to a
judgment about the loan as a whole."'
The main psychological phenomenon whose impacts the classification would

110. Summary of Responses, supranote 16, at 13.
111. Id. at 13-14.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Id at 6.
114. Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 97-98.
115. Id. at 98.
116. Id. at l00.
117. Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 100.
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8
assuage, however, is number four, availability heuristics." This classification
would allow a judgment of probability without requiring consumers to imagine
possible scenarios of which they are not aware. Unfortunately, this classification
system would still leave consumers vulnerable to psychological phenomenon
number 8, acceptance of senseless explanations, and number 9, argument
immunization, as long as lenders and credit intermediaries could find a way to
explain away the classification." 9
Although a loan product that is rated "Risky" or "Very Risky" might make
sense for some consumers given their circumstances, the rating puts consumers on
notice that, for many, this loan is not appropriate and that consumers should obtain
the independent advice of a trained mortgage counselor. For example, if a loan
accrues interest at a floating rate with no cap on how high the rate can rise, it might
warrant a "very risky" rating because rates could rise above what the borrower can
afford. However, if the borrower is very wealthy, and large increases in the
interest rate will not make the loan unaffordable to this borrower; this consumer
may desire to take on this risk and gamble that rates will stay low and she will
benefit from the lower adjustable rate loan as compared to the higher fixed rate.
A second example of a loan that would be risky for a typical homeowner, but
not all consumers, is one where very little or no amount of principal is being paid
during the term of the loan (i.e., an interest only loan). When such loans mature
there is a large balloon payment of principal due. This is risky if, at the time the
loan matures, the mortgage market has changed and it has become more difficult to
obtain a loan. If the borrower does not qualify for a new loan to pay off the
previous one, the borrower will have to sell the home to be able to repay the debt
unless the borrower is wealthy and has other assets or available income to pay off
this debt. A more prudent loan would be a "fully-amortizing" loan, in which
enough principal is being paid each month, in addition to the accrued interest, so
that when the loan matures and becomes due, there is no additional principal
owed.120
If comprehensive risk-based loan product classifications are adopted as part of
a Directive, the ESIS should conspicuously disclose this information on an offered
loan product, along with a recommendation to obtain independent advice when the
offered loan is high risk. The existence of this risk-based classification would also
further the Commission's goal of creating a more integrated EU market that offers
more diverse loan products. This will result because consumers will feel more
confident in taking a home loan from a cross-border lender if that loan is rated with
a low level of risk by an independent body like the Commission. In addition, by
leaming about the different types of home loan products being offered among the

118. See id. at 99-100.
119. See id. at 101-02.
120. UnderstandingFairLending, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, 41, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddocid=DOC 7386.pdf. This
loan is traditionally known as a fixed rate mortgage that is fully paid at the end of the loan period,
and distinguished from a balloon payment mortgage that does not fully amortize. Id.
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Member States, the Commission can better gauge the risks to consumers and can
then better assess whether to impose a suitability duty on mortgage brokers. It will
also be in a better position to determine the circumstances in which borrowers
should be mandated to receive advice before taking on certain home loans.
The main disadvantage to creating a risk-based comprehensive classification
of home loan products and the disclosure in the ESIS of the offered loan's
classification is the creation costs and difficulties. These difficulties will be: (i)
identifying the different home loan products available among the Member States
and periodically updating that list, and (ii) determining the risk-classifications to be
awarded to the different types of home loan products being offered.121 The
Commission should engage in a detailed estimate of costs to create this
classification reform measure. While we have not undertaken this detailed cost
analysis, we do foresee long term benefits from the creation of this classification
system with respect to the Commission's articulated goals of enhancing consumer
protection and consumer confidence. The Commission should take these long term
benefits fully into account when engaging in a cost-benefit analysis in light of their
articulated goals.
The second possible disadvantage of creating a risk classification for home
loans is that a loan might receive a risky rating and dissuade some consumers from
taking on the loan, even though the loan is not risky for every potential borrower.
Indeed, some members of the non-financial services industry who commented on
the creation of risk guidelines indicated that risks depend on the financial
circumstances of the individual, so guidelines may not be useful and could
overstate or understate risks.' 22 To mitigate this possibility, the disclosure in the
ESIS should note the possibility of overstating or understating risks and direct the
consumer to seek advice from an independent 23 mortgage counselor. Some of the
members of the non-financial services industry also raised the possibility that
lenders might react to the risk based guidelines by tailoring their products to those
guidelines. 2 4 This would actually be a positive reaction, since only low cost loans
are categorized as the lowest rated risk based classification.
In contrast to our suggestion, the financial services industry federations doubt
"the possibility of establishing a set of harmonized guidelines."' 25 They opined that
the additional risk warnings were redundant because the other pre-contractual
information is clear and comprehensible, that there are already obligations under
the Consumer Credit Directive to provide suitable explanations, and that most
Member States already mandate informing consumers of the risks.126 Thus, in their

121. We recommend that the Commission take on this task after consultation with the
stakeholders involved.
122. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 6-7.
123. To avoid a conflict of interest, it is very important that the advisor not be the lender,
the mortgage broker or anyone else with an interest in the consumer acquiring the loan. See infra
notes 196-213 (discussing, in greater detail, the fourth additional measure).
124. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 7.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id.
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view, the costs of creating the guidelines exceeded the benefits.
However, the arguments by those in the financial services industry are not
very persuasive. First, based on data reported by the Commission, many
consumers complain that the current pre-contractual information is not clear and
comprehensible; 127 hence, there is a need for this information. Second, providing
this additional information would allow consumers to overcome some of the
cognitive limitations that they struggle with. It would provide an important benefit
to consumers who typically suffer from information asymmetries created by their
lack of knowledge about the loan terms, the available alternatives, and the risks
that different terms pose compared to those who are selling them the loans. The
consumers would not have to wade through long and detailed guidelines, but
instead, under our proposal, the consumer would be given a risk rating for the loan
product offered, based on a simple number scale. Third, the Consumer Credit
Directive the lenders wish to rely upon does not apply to home loans, and even if it
did, it is highly unlikely that an easily comprehensible risk-based classification
would be matched by the simple concept of "adequate information" under that
Directive. Fourth, if self-regulation has not spurred a voluntary ESIS, it is highly
unlikely that it will be effective in a context where mortgage lenders and
intermediaries might be asked to act against their self-interest and explain the risks
of a home loan product they are offering.
Those Member States that were receptive to creating risk guidelines also
mentioned the difficulty in imposing them on the industry and questioned who
should develop these guidelines.128 As previously explained, the risk based
classifications of loan products we propose are an important supplement to the
revised ESIS and should be less difficult to impose on the industry than mandating
the ESIS itself, since there is no heightened burden on lenders and credit
intermediaries if the Commission creates the classification system. To avoid
conflicts of interest, the Commission itself (rather than the entities in the financial
services market) should, with input from the various stakeholders, create the list of
home loan products being offered in the EU market. It should then classify each of
these products by risk, based on criteria similar to those used for an "approved
standard form of prudent home loan product," discussed directly below.
The second measure that we recommend is strongly connected to the first: the
Commission should create an "approved standard form of prudent home loan
product." This loan would be highly prudent and low cost; therefore, consumers
could feel confident in acquiring it. The Commission should consult with the
various stakeholders to determine the mandatory features of such a loan, but the
Commission should finalize these features.129 The advantage of creating a

127. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 15. "According to a Eurobarometer
survey from 2005, 59% of EU citizens surveyed felt that it was difficult to understand the
information given by financial institutions about the way their mortgages work and the risks
involved." Id.
128. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 7.
129. Based on the inability of the representatives from the lending industry and consumer
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Commission-approved standard form of prudent home loan product is that if a loan
complies with the definition, this could be conspicuously noted on the ESIS. As a
result, consumers could feel very confident that they have taken on a prudent and
low cost home loan. Conversely, if the loan product was not given an approved
standard form, this could also be conspicuously noted on the ESIS, along with a
warning that the consumer should seek independent advice regarding the loan.
While the standard form of prudent home loan product indicates that the
Commission has approved certain features of the loan product and thus may
discourage independent analysis, it could also facilitate consumer education of
home loan schemas in that it would provide a default type of loan product to which
all alternative loans that differ from the standard could more easily be compared.
The standard form of prudent home loan product may thereby partially assuage the
effects of psychological phenomenon number two. 130 It would also help overcome
psychological phenomenon number three, inaccurate default assumptions of how
contractual provisions are likely to be structured, since the new standard would
create a default and deviations from this default would be noticeable. The
standards for a loan to qualify as an approved standard form of home loan include
rigid protection of consumers because lenders are not prohibited from making nonstandard loans; the extent of the variation from the standard form can be noted in
the risk classification. By creating an "approved standard form of prudent home
loan product" and a risk classification designation for each loan offered, consumers
are more likely to take on a prudent home loan from a source outside of their
borders, thus promoting the Commission goals of integrating the EU home
mortgage market and enhancing consumer protection.'3 '
In determining the features that would make a home loan product prudent
from the borrower's perspective, we recommend that the "approved standard form
of prudent home loan product" should include the following seven factors. First,
the loan should be either an "affordable," fixed interest rate loan for the entire
term, or an adjustable rate loan with the interest rate increases capped at a level
that the borrower could afford, based on a debt to income ratio.' 32 Second, the loan
should be a fully amortizing loan. This means that if the mortgage market has
tightened or interest rates have risen significantly, the borrower would not be in
representatives to come to agreement on matters like how the APRC should be calculated it is
highly unlikely those groups will be able to come to agreement on the features of the approved
standard form of home loan that is prudent and low cost.
130. Stark & Choplin, supra note 27, at 104-05.
131. White Paper, supra note 2, at 4. The existence of the proposed standard form of
approved home loan product is also likely to induce many lenders and credit intermediaries to
offer this type of low cost and highly prudent loan to the benefit of consumers in light of the
proposed interaction of this form of loan for the benefit of consumers because lenders can comply
with the third (imposing a duty to only offer suitable home loan products for the consumer) and
fourth reforms (mandating independent financial advice for loans rates as "very risky"). Another
approach is to require lenders to first offer the approved standard form of prudent home loan to
the consumer but allow the consumer to opt out and obtain a different home loan product.
132. The fixed interest rate and monthly amortization of the principle of the loan would
need to equal an amount that under a debt to income ratio the Commission considers
"affordable." White Paper,supra note 2, at 4.
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default and lose her home. Third, the interest rate of the loan would not exceed the
average interest rate charged by lenders for a comparably risky home loan. This
ensures that one of the key components of the price of the loan remains consistent
with the market level.133 Fourth, the fees to the lender or credit intermediary
(including any fees associated with paying off the loan prior to its maturity date a "repayment" or "prepayment charge") shall not exceed a specified percentage of
the loan amount and the closing costs shall not exceed a specified percentage of the
loan amount (with a flat dollar amount for very small principle loans).' 34 This
provision controls the key remaining factors for a low-priced loan. Fifth, the loan
would permit prepayments and would recognize only customary events of default.
Customary events include the failure to pay monthly installments or insurance and
real estate taxes, as well as acts of waste or failing to maintain the home such that
the mortgage lien is impaired. On a related matter, the loan must also provide
adequate cure periods in light of the nature of the default. Sixth, in the case of a
refinance, the loan must provide a "net economic benefit" to the borrower. Just
because a borrower pays off a loan accruing interest at, for example, six percent,
with a new loan accruing interest at, for example, five and a half percent, does not
necessarily mean that the borrower will reap a net economic benefit from the
refinance. For there to be a net economic benefit, the borrower needs to hold onto
the new lower interest rate loan long enough so that the reduced interest rate
payments on the new loan exceed the costs the borrower paid to obtain the new
loan. So the potential net economic benefit from a refinance must consider the
anticipated period of time before the borrower takes on a new refinance in addition
to plans to sell the home when the borrower incurs costs to obtain the new home
loan (in contrast to a "no closing costs" home loan which were sometimes offered
in the U.S. where the interest rate charged is a bit higher to take into account those
closing costs). Finally, seventh, the loan should meet any other factors that the
Commission deems to be evidence of a prudent and low cost home loan (these
could include factors relating to whether the lender is making a loan to a
"creditworthy" borrower such as loan to value ratios, the credit history of the
borrower, and the source of the borrower's income).' 35 We presume that the laws
relating to collection and foreclosure applicable to a cross-border loan would still
be the laws in the jurisdiction where the home is located and so this would not be a

133. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 139 (noting that in France a loan is
deemed usurious if the APR is more than one-third of the average percentage rate applied by
credit institutions during the previous quarter for loans of a similar type presenting similar risk
factors). Currently it appears that there is no sub-prime home loan market in the EU, but if that
were to develop, then the average interest rate could
take into account what is average for a comparable home borrower).
134. These should be set by the Commission based on a low cost loan in light of historical
averages for such fees and charges.
135. We have not included these factors in the approved standard form of home loan
because as the Commission's White Paper indicates, they already intend to impose a duty on
lenders to make sure the borrower is creditworthy. See White Paper,supra note 2, at 7. The
factors here focus on the borrower's perspective.
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factor.136
The main disadvantages of creating a Commission approved standard form of
prudent home loan product are the difficulty and costs in creating it and updating it
to account for changes in the marketplace. Borrowers can still select loans that do
not comply with the "approved standard form of home loan product." However,
when doing so, they would first be made aware that the loan they are selecting
contains certain features that may be more risky or unfavorable. They would also
be instructed to seek advice from independent mortgage counselors before
selecting such loans. Like the risk based classification of loans, this information
serves as an easy heuristic for consumers to rely upon when deciding among a
myriad of home loan products.
The Commission sought and received comments from the various
stakeholders on whether they would "welcome a set of standardized or certified
products to be offered to consumers."l 37 The chambers of commerce and some
consumer advocates expressed support for creating standard forms of home loan
products across Member States that would reduce costs.138 Other consumer
advocates commented that all loan products, and not just those which are
39
standardized, should be fair and suitable to the individual needs of the consumer.1
Consumer advocates also cautioned that the standardized products should be
accessible to low-income households or persons and that the standardized products
should be created alongside developing innovative and creative financing solutions
by the industry. We agree, except to the extent that this would permit lenders to
offer a loan product to those with lower incomes that appears affordable but that in
fact does not remain so. 40 Some consumer advocates also noted that the creation
of "certified" home loan products could allow certain products to be offered to
consumers without the need to obtain independent financial advice on the
product.' 4 ' This point is correct and would add efficiency into the system for
consumers because they would already be assured that they were obtaining a
prudent and low cost loan. Some consumer representatives indicated that lenders
should be obligated to present these certified standard form of home loan products
to consumers.142 Consumers could choose to accept the standard form or opt out of
43
it and take out a more sophisticated product that better suits their needs.1 We also
agree that the ultimate decision is for the consumer to make and the default
position should be to offer the approved standard form of prudent home loan
136. White Paper,supra note 2, at 7.
137. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 7.
138. Id.
139. Id. We address this point in our third and fourth proposed reform measures. See text
accompanying notes 153-214.
140. For example, lenders may offer loans with initially low teaser rates that automatically
rise after a few years and become unaffordable or offer loans that are interest-only with a huge
balloon payment when the loan becomes due so the lower income borrower can afford the
monthly payments for some time, but still risk losing the home when the loan comes due.
141. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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product, yet still allow the consumer to opt out of that and select a different home
loan product.'" This may help overcome the biases in attribute estimation and
evaluation, including the status quo or default value bias. 14 5
The financial services industry federations, providers, and financial sector
trade unions commented strongly against standardized products, claiming that they
are not necessary and not fit for purpose. 146 The industry representatives viewed
standardized products as stifling innovation, limiting choice and diversity, and
reducing competition.' 47 They argued that the choice to design and offer a range of
products in response to customer needs should be left to the credit industry.148
Member States were also largely opposed to product standardization, with many
49
arguing there were no inherently unsuitable products.1 A small number of
Member State authorities did, however, show cautious support for product
50
standardization, conditioned upon its not interfering with market autonomy.1 The
trade union representatives indicated they would welcome risk classification and
certification indicating suitability for different consumers, but not
standardization.' 5 ' Based upon this last indication and the comment among some
Member States about market autonomy, it appears that the industry and Member
States mistakenly believed that the creation of standardized home loan products
would exclude the use of other home loan products. In our reform proposal,
consumers would be offered the approved standard form of prudent home loan
product and warned if a home loan was not such a loan, but the consumer would
still be able to choose a different form of home loan product if he or she believed
that another product would better suit his or her needs. Thus, the creation of a
standard form of prudent home loan product will not stifle innovation or limit
choice or diversity. It could also actually increase competition among cross-border
loan providers because consumers would potentially feel more confident accepting
their loan products if they are offering the approved standard form of prudent
home loan. While some consumers may be cautious before entering into a home
loan product different from the approved standard form, this caution is a good
thing and can still be overcome by the mortgage lender or credit intermediary, who
will have the opportunity to explain why a different form of home loan product
would make sense for the borrower.
The third reform measure that we recommend is for the Commission's
144. As protection to the consumer who chooses to opt out of the standard approved form
of home loan, under our reform proposals the consumer would receive the risk classification of
the different loan product. If it is classified as "very risky," the consumer would then be required
to receive independent advice on this first as set forth in the fourth reform measure we propose.
145. See R.H. THALER & C.R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH & HAPPINESS 50 (2009).
146. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 8.
147.

Id

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id
Id at 9.
Id at 8.
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Directive to include a mandated duty on mortgage lenders and intermediaries to
offer only "suitable" home loan products to the consumer. Suitable here means
loans that meet the consumer's basic needs and goals based on certain criteria
developed by the Commission. Due to information asymmetry and the problem of
moral hazard,' 52 imposing a duty of suitability on mortgage lenders and
intermediaries is a way to level the playing field.'5 3 Although the Revised ESIS, if
made mandatory and further revised as we recommended in Section 11, would
provide consumers with the basic important information on the mortgage loan
presented to them,' 54 the various cognitive and social psychological barriers
discussed in Section II' may limit its effectiveness. Imposing a duty of suitability
can enhance consumer confidence and consumer protection by providing a strong
incentive to mortgage lenders and intermediaries to only offer consumers loans
that satisfy the suitability standard.
Without this duty there is great potential for consumers to be offered home
loans that do not meet their basic needs and goals. Moreover, consumers will often
be unaware that this is occurring. But with this reform, consumers can overcome a
variety of psychological phenomena discussed in this article including: lack of
contractual schemas or knowledge structures,15 6 assumptions regarding whether the
acceptance of senseless explanations and argument
contract is negotiable,'
immunization, strong motivations to trust,' and social norms and signals that
152. The Conmission of the European Commities has commented on the relationship
between the interests of mortgage lenders and the interests of borrowers:
Taking these factors into account [the asymmetric relationship where the interests of a
mortgage lender and borrower are skewed because the lender can always look to the collateral
to pay off the debt or if the lender plans to sell the loan to a third party, and a desire to avoid
the time involved in determining if the loan is one the borrower can afford to repay] . . . the
consumer might be presented with a range of products that does not fully reflect his financial
needs and circumstances. Consequently, there is a risk that the consumer chooses a product
for which there is a chance that consumers may fail to meet their contractual obligations and
thus may eventually loose [sic] their home.
Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 41.
153. To avoid potential liability to the consumer for the harm consumers suffer as a result
of being induced to take on an "unsuitable" home loan, lenders and credit intermediaries will be
induced to offer loans that meet the suitability standard. Determining the enforcement measures
for the reforms proposed is beyond the scope of this paper and a matter that the Commission
would need to consider in a fashion similar to enforcement mechanisms used for other Directives.
154. See supra Part II.
155. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 35.
156. The proposed duty prevents offering fiscally unsophisticated consumers an unsuitable
loan.
157. Individuals might have taken on an unsuitable loan because they mistakenly believed
they could not negotiate for a better one, but with the suitability requirement in place they will not
be offered an unsuitable home loan in the first place; R.P. Hill & J.C. Kozup, Consumer
Experiences with PredatoryLending Practices, 41 J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 29, 40 (2007).
158. This is because lenders and credit intermediaries would no longer be able to explain
J.C. Choplin, D.P. Stark & J. Ahmad, A Psychological
the unsuitable features away.
Investigation of Consumer Vulnerability to Fraud:Legal and Policy Implications, L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 35 (forthcoming).
159. Consumers are often insecure about obtaining a loan and then feel that the lender has
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encourage minimal attention to material presented in forms.' 60 It appears that little
data has been collected on the extent to which consumers in the EU Member States
are being offered "unsuitable" home loans.' 6 ' However, the Commission noted that
data collected in the UK reflects that in one-third of the files reviewed 62 "there
was an inadequate assessment of consumers' ability to afford the mortgage credit
product sold"' 63 and that "in almost half the files reviewed there was an inadequate
assessment of customers' suitability (e.g., needs and circumstances) for the
mortgage."'6
The term "suitable" with regard to home loans should be defined by the
Commission after consultation with the various stakeholders. In our opinion, the
definition should include, at a minimum, the first two of the following three
factors. First, the loan must be one that the borrower can afford to repay.165
Second, in the case of a refinance, the loan must be one that provides a net
economic benefit to the borrower in light of the anticipated period of time before
the borrower takes on a new refinance or plans to sell the home (with an exception
for a refinance for a different purpose, when clearly documented).'66 Finally, the
loan must either be at the average current interest rate, fees, and closing costs

conferred a great benefit to them by providing them with a loan, and consequently are less likely
to question the loan terms. Hill & Kozup, supra note 157, at 40. But the suitability requirement
places the two parties on more even footing and helps avoid this misconception.
160. Since consumers should only be offered suitable home loans, there is less risk from
their failure to read the terms of an unsuitable product.
161. See Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 40.
162. Id. at 41. The loans reviewed were for borrowers with impaired credit histories who
were being offered sub-prime loans.
163. Id.
164. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14,at 40.
165. The affordability issue would be based on applying a debt to income ratio determined
by the Commission after consulting with the stakeholders. One difficulty may be taking into
account the fact that a ratio greater than, say, 33% may be imprudent in some countries but
prudent in other countries in light of differing cost of living expenses in each country. The
Commission would have to take this into account when establishing debt to income ratios and
may want to consider different ratios based on different costs of living circumstances among the
Member States. Also, consumer advocates noted that while a 30% loan to income ratio may be
unaffordable to a low-income family, it might be affordable for higher-income individuals and
that each case should be taken individually on the issue of affordability. Summary of Responses,
supra note 16, at 9. Consumer and user representatives, a corporate representative, and financial
sector trade unions noted that upper limits of loan to income ratios should be considered within
the range of 33-40%, as currently apply in some national laws. Id. at 10.
166. The concept of "net economic benefit" was defined in the discussion of the standard
form of approved home loan. See text accompanying notes 135-137. However, it is recognized
that if the consumer needs to refinance the debt on her home due to an emergency or for any other
purpose unrelated to reducing the costs of her loan, then the consumer is free to do so and the
mortgage broker or lender will have no liability, in this circumstance. The mortgage lender or
broker would need to document this situation with the borrower filling out a form indicating that
they realize they are not receiving a net economic benefit from the loan and are refinancing for
other purposes.
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charged for loans within a specified geographic range 67 of the mortgaged property
and with a comparable loan to a comparable borrower (to avoid price disparities)
or the loan must be one with higher rates and costs by no more than a specified
percentage set by the Commission.
The first factor of suitability, referred to here as affordability, is the
cornerstone of responsible lending. It ensures that the borrower can afford to repay
the loan and consequently would not lose their home or equity as a result of a
default in repaying the debt. It relates to the "creditworthiness" of the borrower, a
factor that all Member State and stakeholder comments indicate lenders should
always take it into account.169 It is necessary to create a duty to offer only
"affordable" home loans to consumers because both credit intermediaries and
home lenders may have an incentive not to do so. Credit intermediaries and
lenders will earn fees from making unaffordable home loans (perhaps even higher
fees than with an affordable home loan), regardless of whether the borrower makes
payments on the loan throughout the term of the loan. If the borrower fails to
make payments on an unaffordable loan there is no negative impact to credit
intermediaries. There may even be no negative impact on lenders if the value of
the home and costs to recover on this collateral in a foreclosure exceeds the
mortgage debt on the home or if the lenders have sold the mortgage loans to the
70
secondary market without retaining any exposure to such loan defaults.1
In reaction to the large scale granting of unaffordable home loans in the U.S
before the financial meltdown in 2007, commentators have advocated for a duty of
7
suitability that focuses on the affordability of the loan and certain other reforms.' '

167. The region should be large enough in size to encompass many communities to avoid
charging members of certain communities more than members of other communities but not so
large as to encompass regions with varying circumstances that would explain price valid
disparities.
168. The interest rate, fees, and closing costs issue were already discussed regarding
creating a standard form of approved home loan. Here, they could be even above those figures
for comparably situated borrowers under comparable loans up to a cap set by the Commission.
169. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 11 (noting that "Member States stated that
the burden of proof should be on the lenders to demonstrate how they have fulfilled the
creditworthiness assessment requirements, without stipulating exactly how this should be done").
170. Although the EU Member States do not have a secondary mortgage market to the same
level as in the U.S., creating a stronger secondary mortgage market for home loans was one of the
articulated goals of the Commission in the Green Paper. See generally Green Paper,supra note
3.
171.

See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law

and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1343-44 (2005) (also raising, as
reforms, prohibiting yield spread premiums, tump sum insurance payments, and requiring an
economic rational for a refinance). Engel and McCoy advocated a duty of suitability to be
imposed on mortgage lenders and credit intermediaries applying the Coase theory that the person
who can prevent a harm at the lowest cost should have the burden of doing so. Id. at 1335. In
this scenario, the duty would be imposed on the home mortgage lender and credit intermediary
rather than the borrower since financial literacy efforts for consumers are costly and unlikely to
succeed and the problems posed with sales tactics of mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers. Id
at 1336. Additionally, they argued that disclosures are inadequate and that consumers rely on
intermediaries. Id. at 1280.
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This duty would apply to all home mortgage loans, not just very high priced home
loans. 172 Although there is no large sub-prime mortgage market among the EU
Member States as there was in the United States, there is still great potential
among the EU Member States for credit intermediaries and even lenders to offer
loans that the consumers may not be able to repay. Consequently, it is important
to create a duty on lenders and credit intermediaries in the EU Member States to
only offer home loans to consumers that meet the "affordability" standard
established by the Commission at the time the loan is made. 174 Because credit
intermediaries and lenders should already be considering affordability issues in the
context of the "creditworthiness" assessment, imposing this duty should not create
any significant additional burden on lenders and credit intermediaries. We
recommend that the standard of affordability established by the Commission
should be a "floor" (i.e., a minimum standard based at least on the creation of a
prudent debt to income ratios).'75 Such a floor would still permit lenders to apply
any additional factors for borrowers to meet in order to preserve the lender's
autonomy in determining affordability, once the minimum duty has been satisfied.
The second suitability factor proposed would only apply to a "refinance" of a
home loan mortgage. Under the duty of suitability, if a borrower is taking out a
new home loan to pay off an existing one in order to take advantage of prevailing
lower interest rates, then there must be a net economic benefit from the
refinance.' 76 However, as discussed previously, a lower interest rate does not
necessarily mean that the refinance provides a net economic benefit to the
borrower. This is a point many borrowers fail to realize. Consequently, for a
refinance loan to be suitable, it must provide a net economic benefit to the

172. See Federal Reserve Board Amendment to Regulation Z, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (July 30,
2008) (four new protections to "high priced loans" are: (a) prohibiting "unaffordable loans", (b)
prohibiting certain prepayment charges, (c) requiring escrows for taxes and insurance, and (d)
prohibiting evasions of these protections with spurious open end loans).
173. In particular, the use of floating rate loans is common and lenders should be required
to make sure that the maximum potential rate of the loan stays within a range that borrower can
afford
to
pay.
Types
of
Bonds,
INVESTING
IN
BONDS
EUROPE,
http://www.investinginbondseurope.org/Pages/LearnAboutBonds.aspx?id=6354 (Mar. 26, 2010).
174. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 9. If the borrower falls on hard times after
the loan is made due to illness, divorce or unemployment (three key causes of default) this does
not make a loan unaffordable or subject the lender to a claim of breach of duty, a concern raised
by the financial services industry federations. Id. On the other hand, marketing a loan to
someone with an initial low teaser rate that can then rise to levels beyond what the consumer can
afford at the time the loan is made would be a breach of the duty. Aaron Smith, Note, A
Suitability Standard for Mortgage Brokers: Developing a Common Law Theory, 17 GEO. J.
POVERTY LAW&POL'Y 377, 386 (2010).

175. For example, many stakeholders noted that upper limits of a loan to income ratio
should be considered within the 33-40% range "as currently apply in some national laws."
Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 9.
176. Typically the essential reason for a consumer to refinance a prior home loan debt is for
the expected net economic benefit of paying a lower amount of interest under the new loan, but if
the closing costs are not recouped from this lower amount of interest there is no net economic
benefit from entering into the new loan.
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consumer, or the consumer must sign a document indicating that the purpose of the
refinance is not for a net economic benefit, 7 7 but for another purpose. For
example, a refinance that increases the loan amount may cause the consumer to use
the additional amount for personal reasons.' 78 The U.S. Congress enacted a law
that required a net economic benefit, at least in the context of very high cost home
loans. 179 This was done in reaction to the practice by U.S. mortgage brokers and
lenders of inducing borrowers to repeatedly refinance their homes over a short
period of time at lower interest rates from the prior loan, but with high costs
associated in obtaining the new loans. These costs eliminated the borrower's net
economic benefit from each refinance (a predatory loan feature referred to as "loan
flipping").18 0 This harmful practice, which typically arises in an environment of
declining interest rates, can be greatly discouraged by imposing a duty on home
lenders and credit intermediaries to either create a net economic benefit to the refinancing borrower or to clearly document that the consumer has accepted the
refinance with a different purpose. Determining if there is a "net economic
benefit," as defined by the Commission, will impose a small additional
administrative burden on lenders and credit intermediaries.' 8 ' However, imposing
this duty will provide an important protection to consumers who think they are
making a wise home loan decision by replacing a higher interest loan with a lower
interest one, when in fact they are not likely to receive any benefit from the
refinance due to their schema deficit regarding financial literacy.
The third potential suitability factor requires that the consumer is offered a
177. The document should explain what a "net economic benefit" is and how it does not
exist under the contemplated refinance.
178. For example, the borrower may wish to use the additional funds to purchase a luxury
item or to pay off other, non-secured debts that might be accruing interest at a higher interest rate
than the interest rate on the home loan. In the U.S. many may seek out a refinance to pay off
health care expenses or educational expenses, but these uses are less likely in the EU market
where the government is more likely to cover these types of expenses than in the U.S. Kerry
Cappel, Is Europe's Health Care Better?, BLOOMBERG BUsINESSWEEK (June 13, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2007/gb20070613_921562.htm; Jim Sheng,
Comparison of Tuition Costs of Higher Education Around the World, HUBPAGES,
http://hubpages.com/hub/Comparison-of-cost-of-higher-education-around-the-world (last visited
Mar. 12, 2011).
179. Section 1639(h) of Title 15 of the United States Code provides:
A creditor shall not engage in a pattern or practice of extending credit to consumers under
mortgages referred to in section 103(aa) of this title based on the consumers' collateral
without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers' current and
expected income, current obligations, and employment.
15 U.S.C. § 1639 (h).
180. Debra P. Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep's Clothing: A Legislative
Proposal,21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 139 (2005); see also Hasa A. Kingo, Note, Preying
on the American Dream: The Argument for HOEPA Reform Amidst PredatoryLending's Dire
Effects on the ElderlyPoor, 17 GEo. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 335, 351 (2010).
181. Lenders or credit intermediaries will need to inquire of the borrower on the likely
period of time the borrower will hold onto the proposed new loan, keeping in mind possibilities
of sale of the home or a future refinance of the debt for various reasons besides a drop in interest
rates. They will then need to check if the reduced interest payments over that period of time of
holding the new loan exceeds the fees and costs to obtain the new home loan.
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loan at an interest rate, fees, and costs no higher (beyond a specified permitted
percentage) than the average interest rates, fees, or closing costs currently charged
by lendersl 82 to similarly situated consumers. 1 83 The effect of this provision will be
to discourage mortgage lenders and credit intermediaries from engaging in
significant price disparities to the detriment of some consumers.' 8 4 This is not the
same as a usury law, as there is no cap on the interest rate or closing costs charged,
but instead a restriction that would prohibit lenders from treating similarly situated
borrowers to differently priced home loans. Due to the large administrative
burdens from imposing this as a duty, 1 we propose that this third factor not
necessarily become a part of the suitability factors until data is collected to
determine if price disparities are a significant problem in the EU. In the U.S. there
is evidence that African-Americans, Hispanics, and the elderly are
disproportionately targeted for higher interest rate and higher closing cost loans
even after taking into account the creditworthiness of the borrowers. 18 If data
reveals that similar disproportionate targeting exists in the EU, then this last
suitability factor will also need to be implemented.
Because all three of the factors impose a duty of suitability on the mortgage
broker or lender that would already be satisfied under the approved standard form
of home loan, there should be a presumption that the duty of suitability has been
satisfied when the consumer is offered a loan that is an approved standard form of
prudent home loan product. Thus, the duty of suitability will also encourage
mortgage lenders and intermediaries to propose the approved standard form of
182. As previously discussed, the lender would look at the average interest rate, fees, and
costs charged by lenders within a specified geographic range of the home serving as collateral for
the loan. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
183. Similarly situated consumers would mean similar in terms of debt to income ratios,
credit histories, and loan to value ratios.
184. Green Paper,supra note 3, at 3 (articulating the goal of enhancing price convergence),
185. Lenders should already be calculating debt-to-income ratios and loan-to-value ratios,
but unless there is a reliable credit score for the consumer it will be difficult to compare one
consumer's credit history against another's. Although consumers in the U.S. are routinely rated
by various credit report companies, this does not appear to be the case to the same level among
the EU Member States. White Paper,supra note 2, at 15 (the Commission noted that an Expert
Group on Credit Histories was established to help the Commission prepare adequate measures to
improve the accessibility, comparability and completeness of credit data in the E.U.).
186. See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENsTEIN BOCIAN, ET AL., THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY
available
at
MORTGAGES
10
(2006),
ON
THE
PRICE
OF
SUBPRIME
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/rrOl 1-UnfairLending0506.pdf (stating that Latinos and African-Americans are twenty-eight percent and thirty-seven
percent more likely, respectively, to receive a higher-rate subprime loan than whites); Michael S.
Barr, et al., Who Gets Lost in the Subprime Mortgage Fallout? Homeowners in Low and

Moderate Income Neighborhoods 2-3 (2008), http://ssrn.con/abstract-1 121215 (suggesting that
even in similar low income neighborhoods, African-American homeowners are significantly more

likely to have a loan with a prepayment charge even after controlling for age, income, gender, and
creditworthiness); see also Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The
Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 167, 180-81 (2007) (maintaining that "subprime and predatory lending

disproportionately impact seniors").
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prudent home loan product and to only offer alternative forms of home loans when
they can still meet the three criteria articulated above.
The proposed duty of suitability is based upon a similar foundation as the
duty most governments already impose on mortgage lenders and credit
intermediaries not to engage in fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Such conduct
taints the agreement that the consumer enters into because the consumer is not
getting what she bargained for; the result is inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of the consumer regarding the transaction. Similarly, consumers
reasonably expect that the complicated home loan being offered to them by an
expert in home loans will meet certain basic needs and goals they have regarding
the loan. They may be relying upon these experts not to offer them loans that do
not meet these basic needs and goals.
Indeed, some Member States already impose duties on mortgage lenders that
are similar to aspects of the suitability duty proposed. For example, in Belgium,
mortgage lenders are obliged to inform themselves of the consumer's situation and
to "look, amongst the credit contracts they usually offer or for which they usually
intervene, for the type and amount of credit best adapted, owing to the financial
situation of the consumer at the time the contract is concluded (and to the aim of
the credit)."' In Ireland, mortgage lenders must collect sufficient information
from the consumer to enable them to provide a recommendation for a product or
service appropriate to that consumer.'88 In the United Kingdom, mortgage lenders
need to have a written responsible lending policy in place, setting out the factors
that they will take into account in assessing a customer's ability to repay, while
keeping an adequate record to demonstrate they have taken account of the
customer's ability to repay.' 89 Recognizing the need for better consumer protection
in the home loan market, several states in the United States have enacted
legislation imposing duties of affordability and net economic benefit on mortgage
brokers or lenders when offering home loans to consumers. 90
187.
188.
189.
190.

Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 36.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.60.350(b) (2011) (requiring licensees to consider

various factors in determining net benefit to the borrower); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-39-510 (4)
(2010) (requiring licensees to make reasonable efforts to secure a loan that is reasonably
advantageous to the borrower considering rates, repayment terms, and charges); 205 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 635/5-7 (1) (LexisNexis 2011) (imposing duty to act in the borrower's best interest);
205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/5-6 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring verification of borrower's
reasonable ability to repay real estate taxes, homeowner's insurance, assessments, principal and
interest); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 9-A § 10-303-A (1)(F) (2011) (requiring licensee to make
reasonable effort to obtain a loan reasonably advantageous to the borrower regarding rates,
charges, and repayment terms); MD. CODE REGS. 09.03.06.20 (A)(1) (2011) (imposing duty to
recommend mortgage loans that have a net tangible benefit to the borrower); 960 MASS. CODE
REGS. 8.06 (LexisNexis 2010) (declaring it unfair practice for mortgage brokers to make a loan
that is not in the best interests of the borrower); MINN. STAT § 58.161 (2010) (imposing duty to
ensure mortgage loan is in the best interest of the borrower); MINN. STAT. § 58.13, (2010)
(requiring licensees to verify the consumer's reasonable ability to pay before making a mortgage
loan; i.e. licensee must verify ability to pay real estate taxes, interest, homeowner's insurance,
assessments, mortgage insurance premiums, and principal); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 397-A: 15(x)
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However, it appears that no Member States currently impose a duty on home
lenders and credit intermediaries to only offer a "suitable" home loan as proposed
in this article.1'9 Mortgage lenders and credit intermediaries are likely to object to
the burden this duty would impose on them. They would need to check to ensure
not only that the consumer can afford the loan, but also to ensure that a net
economic benefit accrues to the borrower in the case of a refinance. This could be
time consuming. It may also result in the loss of business if it turns out that the
loan offered is not affordable or if the refinance does not offer a net economic
benefit. Although representatives of the financial services industry federations
agreed that creditworthiness should always be assessed, they were even against the
establishment of mandatory criteria or mandatory tools for that assessment. They
cited a desire to retain their freedom to make this determination and to "preserve
competition" in the banking business.1 92 In addition, they objected to EU-wide
harmonization of credit-worthiness assessments "since specific criteria have to be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis and there are national specificities to take into
account." 93 To accommodate these points (and also because our reform proposal
is centered on the goal of enhancing consumer protection), our proposal focuses
only on the affordability aspect of the creditworthiness assessment.19 4 This

(LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting lenders from arranging a loan unless reasonable lender would
believe borrower will be able to make the scheduled payments); N.M. REv. STAT. ANN § 58-21-8
(LexisNexis 2010) (A licensee shall not arrange a mortgage without documentation of the
borrower's reasonable ability to repay); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN § 58-21B-20(5) (LexisNexis
2010) (requiring mortgage loan originators to "direct, recommend and make reasonable efforts to
secure a residential mortgage loan that is reasonably advantageous to the borrower, considering
all of the circumstances, and has a net tangible benefit to the borrower"); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN §
52-21B-20(7) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring mortgage loan originator to disclose to applicants
more favorable loans for which the applicant qualifies that were not offered by the originator);
N.Y.BANKING LAW § 590-(f) (Consol. 2011) (requiring mortgage brokers to provide borrowers
with a range of loan products that are appropriate to the borrower's circumstances and that which
the borrower qualifies); OHIO. REV. CODE. ANN § 1322.08 1(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring
mortgage brokers to make reasonable efforts to secure a loan with repayment terms that are
advantageous to the borrower); 10 PA. CODE § 46.2 (g)(1) (2011) (requiring the licensee to
determine that the borrower will have ability to repay the loan); W. VA. CODE ANN § 31-1712(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for the suspension or revocation of a mortgage broker's
license if loan made to consumer who has insufficient sources of income to timely repay the
debt).
191. Summary of Responses, supra note 16, at 11. Member States that commented on
whether there should be a duty of suitability stated that while lenders should have a duty to take
into account creditworthiness of the borrower, lenders should not have a duty to take into account
the "suitability" of the loan for the borrower's particular circumstances and that borrowers should
do this themselves. Id.
192. Id. at 10.
193. Id.
194. To the extent that the lending industry wishes to make loans to individuals who
strongly appear not to be able to afford paying the loan back (e.g., to a borrower who would have
a debt service ratio of 50% or higher), under the concept of freedom of contract and "preserving
competition"-i.e. the right to operate in a very high risk market-the recent sub-prime crisis in
the U.S. provides a good example of how this can be very harnful to the public generally and
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establishes a minimum level of affordability standard, while still allowing lenders
to require a higher level of affordability. It also leaves them the discretion to
determine a borrower's creditworthiness (subject of course to local fair
lending/anti-discrimination laws).
The second aspect of the suitability duty we proposed is a net economic
benefit from a refinance. It would be based upon a fairly simple calculation after
inquiring into the borrower's specific situation, and it would also take into account
the borrower's articulated plans and goals regarding the proposed refinance.
The Commission did not raise the possibility of the third potential suitability
factor considered in this article and so there is no feedback from the stakeholders
on this. We anticipate, however, that for a variety of reasons, the financial industry
will be strongly opposed to this proposed reform. First, it would create a higher
administrative burden for lenders, compared with the first two recommended
elements. Furthermore, this third aspect of the duty of suitability would cut into
the profits that the mortgage lender or credit intermediary would otherwise be able
to make on the home loan, due to the cap set by the Commission. In addition,
imposing any duty of suitability will be objectionable to mortgage lenders and
credit intermediaries due to the potential exposure to liability an alleged breach of
this duty would cause. For these reasons, unless collected data reflects a problem
with price disparities in the home mortgage markets among a majority of the EU
Member States, we do not propose that this third aspect should currently be
included in the Directive for the suitability duty. Rather, data on this question
should first be collected.
However, the Directive can address the lender's desire to avoid the additional
burdens that the duty of suitability would impose. It can also address their concern
that a breach of the proposed duty will expose them to liability for the consumer's
damages. In order to do so, the Directive should provide that not only will the duty
of suitability be presumed to be met if the loan offered to the borrower is on the
standard form of approved home loan products, but that the duty will also be
presumed to have been met if the lender pays for the consumer to receive
independent advice on a non-approved home loan from a certified, trained
mortgage counselor. As detailed below, the charge for this advice can be regulated
and kept to reasonable amounts. This would be a way for home lenders and credit
intermediaries to avoid the liability issue and burden of checking suitability, while
also protecting consumers.
Creating a duty of suitability that the mortgage lender and credit intermediary
can opt out of by providing a loan on the standard form of approved home loan
product or by paying for the consumer to receive independent advice on the
offered loan creates a "sticky" default rule.'9 5 Lenders and credit intermediaries

should be regulated. William F. Buckley Jr., If Only we Could Regulate the Subprime Crisis
3,
2008,
Jan.
CHRONICLE,
HOUSTON
Away,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorialloutlook/5426356.html.
195. See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICE
at
available
(2008),
1,
8-9
FOUND.
AM.
NEW
REGULATION,
http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafbehavioral v5.pdf. When a default rule is not against the
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now have a strong incentive to encourage borrowers to take a loan that meets the
standards of the approved form of prudent home loan or to pay for counseling for
the borrower if the borrower chooses a more risky home loan. Without the
suitability duty, the lenders and credit intermediaries are far more likely to
encourage the consumer to take on a home loan product that provides the best
financial return to the lender and credit intermediary even when the loan is not
suitable for the consumer's need and goals.
The fourth reform measure we recommend is a Directive that requires the
consumer to receive advice from an independent, certified as trained mortgage
counselor when the loan being offered to the consumer is at the "very risky" level
of risk classification. This is due to the complexity of the decision-making process
among the numerous forms of home loan options available and the potential, as
explained in Section II, for consumers to be misled by a mortgage lender or broker
into a non-prudent and/or overpriced home loan. According to a Eurobarometer
survey from 2005, seventy-two percent of consumers surveyed expect financial
institutions to give them advice,196 but only forty-six percent of the consumers
surveyed said they actually trusted the advice provided by financial institutions.197
These two facts suggest that many consumers desire advice on the home loan
products, but would prefer that this advice come from independent sources rather
than individuals with a financial interest in the loan being offered. Done properly,
this reform proposal could help overcome all fourteen of the psychological barriers
to wise home-loan decision-making outlined in Section 11.198 The Commission staff
noted the many benefits of providing objective advice to consumers.199
In an integrated market, the provision of objective advice plays a
particularly significant role. In such a market, mortgage lenders can
enter markets and offer their own range of products and, at the same
interest of a service provider then it should operate as intended to lead consumers through
inaction to "choose" the default choice (for example having a certain percentage of one's income

going into a 401K type retirement fund). Id. at 10. But when the default rule is not in the interest
of the service provider then something must be done to cause the service provider not to have as
strong an incentive to steer the consumer away from the default choice. Id. at 9. Thus, creating a
duty of suitability which can be presumed satisfied if the mortgage lender or credit intermediary
offers and the borrower takes out the standard form of prudent home loan would be a way of
creating a "sticky" default rule regarding offering the standard form of prudent home loan. Id. at
8-10. However, "where firms' incentives misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules
alone may not work well since firms may have the ability to work creatively around those rule
changes." Id. at 3.
196. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 36.

197. Id.
198. See Abdighani Hirad & Peter Zorn, A Little Knowledge Is a Good Thing: Empirical
Evidence of the Effectiveness of Pre-Purchase Homeownership Counseling, in LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP
WORKING
PAPER
SERIES
2
(2001),
available
at

http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-4.pdf (stating that homeowners
who receive individual counseling under Freddie Mac's Affordable Gold program are forty-one
percent less likely ever to become 60-day delinquent on their home loans than equivalent
borrowers in the study who do not receive such counseling).
199. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 41.
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time, consumers can, if they wish, shop cross-border for a progressively
wider variety of products. As a consequence, consumers will be faced
with choosing from a wider range of unfamiliar and even more complex
products. Being able to receive advice will therefore be increasingly
vital in terms of consumer confidence. Given the high value of a
mortgage credit together with its social and economic importance,
consumers need to be confident that they are taking out the best product
for their needs. From a mortgage lender or investor perspective, there is
risk of problems arising from moral hazard in that the adviser may have
incentives to recommend a product other than the one which is best
suited for the consumer.200
The Commission specifically required that consumers "have access to
objective advice which is based on the profile of the customer and commensurate
with the complexity of the products and the risks involved." 201 Although the
Commission noted that mandatory advice "would ensure that a consumer receives
a clear recommendation for one or more product" it would also "ensure that these
products meet a consumer's individual needs," the Commission also noted that
more experienced consumers may not need or even want advice due to the time
this would take or because it may increase the costs for the loan. 202 Consequently,
although the Commission endorsed the reform of creating advice standards once a
party elects to provide advice to a borrower about a home loan, the Commission
decided that the advice should not be made mandatory, but instead only offered
upon request of the borrower.203
Mortgage lenders also disfavored imposing mandatory mortgage advice,
arguing that not all consumers necessarily need or require advice and that an
2
obligation to provide advice would increase the cost of all mortgage loans. 04
Member States were reported as divided on whether the provision of advice should
be compulsory, with a majority opposed to introduction of mandatory advice, but
205
The reform
favoring introduction of standards for the provision of advice.
proposal relating to mandatory mortgage counseling outlined below addresses the
valid objection that mandatory counseling could potentially cause some consumers
to pay for a service that they neither need nor desire.
When asked whether providing advice should be compulsory, fifty percent of
the consumers and users who provided feedback on the Green Paper indicated that

200. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 41.
201. Id. at 44.
202. Id. at 50. The Commission also noted the problems with advice coming from the
lenders including the risk that mandatory advice will cause companies that already provide this
advice to lose their business. Id. However, the mandatory advice proposed would not come from
lenders or credit intermediaries compensated for arranging the loan but instead come from an
independent source. The market for advice would remain open to all under our proposal except to
lenders and mortgage brokers who would profit from inducing the consumer to take out the
proposed loan.
203. Id. at 54-55.
204. Impact Assessment Annex 3, supra note 14, at 43.
205. Id.
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they desired the advice to be compulsory, while the other half did not.
address the fact that some consumers may not desire advice before entering into a
home loan because the loan being offered to them is prudent and not risky, advice
would only be mandated when the loan is not on the approved standard form of
home loan and is rated as very risky. When the loan product being offered is
classified as very risky, then consumers will typically benefit from the mandatory
receipt of advice, as there is a stronger chance both that the home loan being
offered to them is- not a loan that the borrower should be taking and that the
borrower might not otherwise be aware of this. An example of such a high-risk
loan would be an "equity release" loan (commonly called a "reverse mortgage" in
the United States). 207 Due to the high cost of reverse mortgages and special risks of
208
losing the home when a senior takes out this type of loan, many seniors would
be making a serious mistake in entering into this type of loan, but might be induced
to do so by lenders and intermediaries who seek the higher origination fees
associated with this complicated loan product. 209
However, there are several other reasons some consumers might not want to
receive mandatory advice prior to taking out a home loan, even a loan classified as
very risky. For example, if the consumer considers herself to be highly
sophisticated and knowledgeable about the particular home loan product being
offered, as well as the alternatives, she may think that it is a waste of time and of

206. Id. at 42.

207. A reverse mortgage is a loan available to seniors aged 62 or older in the United States.
A reverse mortgage releases the home equity in the property as one lump sum or multiple
payments made from the lender to the homeowner. The homeowner's obligation to repay the loan
is deferred until the owner dies, the home is sold, or the owner ceases to occupy the home. About
Reverse

Mortgages,

REVERSEMORTGAGE.ORG,

http://www.reversemortgage.org/Default.aspx?tabid=230 (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
208. Maya Jackson Randall, Debate on Reverse-Mortgage Risks Heat Up, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 2010; Jim Puzzanghera, Greater Oversight of Reverse Mortgages Urged, L.A. TIMES,

Dec. 8, 2010. Seniors' health concerns can compound the risk of foreclosure. For example, if a
senior becomes ill or injured and is being cared for at a hospital or nursing home for more than
one year, under the loan documents for a reverse mortgage the senior will be in default under the
loan and can lose their home. One survey revealed that almost half of all respondents indicated
that their foreclosure was partially caused by medical illness or injury. See Christopher T.
Robertson, et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH
MATRIX 65, 68 (2008).

209. These loans tend to be very high cost and only suitable for seniors who lack the
necessary income to make ends meet and cannot afford a less costly means of paying their bill,
but have enough equity in their home so that under the reverse mortgage the senior will receive
adequate funds during their lifetime to pay for some of the senior's everyday expenses and also
more substantial expenses such as real estate taxes. Carolyn H. Sawyer, Reverse Mortgages: An
Innovative Tool for Elder Law Attorneys, 26 STETSON L. REV. 617, 620-21 (1996).

If the

borrower fails to budget in real estate taxes and insurance and later the borrower lacks money for
those items then the lender can claim the borrower is in default of the loan and re-take the home.
Michael Gusto, Mortgage Foreclosuresfor Secondary Breaches: A Practitioner's Guide to
Defining "Security Impairment", 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2563, 2563-64 (2005); Jim Flynn,
Consequences High for Unpaid Property Taxes, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 2007,

http://www.gazette.com/articles/tax-2006 1-taxes-property.html.
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her money to be forced to receive advice on this high risk loan. If the Commission
wishes to address this situation they could create a summary of the benefits and
detriments of each loan product reviewed, as well as the characteristics that make
the loan to be appropriate for different consumers. This summary could be offered
to consumers in an interactive computer training session, including self-tests to
determine if the consumer has absorbed this information. If the consumer still
desires to waive receipt of advice after successfully completing the training
session, she can.
Another reason some consumers might object to mandatory advice is to avoid
the time delays and costs in obtaining this advice. To address the costs issue, the
training session could be at an affordable, regulated charge (probably comparable
to the charge for an appraisal of the property) that cannot be exceeded, and may in
fact be paid by the mortgage lender or mortgage intermediary. 21 0 Furthermore, if
an adequate number of companies are licensed to train mortgage counselors, then a
mandatory advice requirement should not add significant delays to the closing of
the loan.211
Finally, some consumers may not desire mandatory counseling advice
because they believe that the mortgage intermediary or lender they are working
with would not offer them a higher priced loan than they could qualify for or
would not offer them a loan that contains risky or otherwise unsuitable features.
Unfortunately, this trust may be misplaced because the mortgage intermediary has
a conflict of interest with the borrower. Mortgage brokers are typically
compensated based on a commission earned only when the loan is funded, so even
if the loan poses risks to the borrower, does not meet the borrower's needs or
goals, or is overpriced, it is still in the mortgage broker's interest to push that loan,
especially when the loan amount is high and the commission is based on the
amount of the loan.212 There is also a conflict of interest with the lender in that the
lender's profit is also based on the funding of the loan; the higher the origination
charges, the higher the lender's profits. Consequently, prudent consumers should
not trust the mortgage broker or mortgage lender to find them the most suitable and
low cost loan possible (unless such a duty is already imposed on them), but should
instead seek independent advice when being offered a high cost or otherwise risky
loan. Indeed, as detailed in Section II, unscrupulous mortgage lenders or credit

210. See e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2011) (Under an
Illinois law that mandates mortgage counseling for certain "high risk home loans" the mortgage
broker or lender must pay for the counseling, which is by statute limited to no more than $300,
which is less than the cost of a typical home appraisal report). This approach could be adopted by
the EU as well. Indeed, if a duty of suitability is already in place, many mortgage lenders and
mortgage brokers who offer loans that are not on the standard form of approved loan product
would probably not find paying for this counseling to be so objectionable since through it they
will gain the presumption that the duty of suitability was met.
211. According to data from the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation's Anti-Predatory Lending Database Program, an average counseling session may last
2-3

hours.

ANTI-PREDATORY

LENDING

DATABASE

https://www.ilapld.com/defaut.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
212. HearingBefore the S. Comm, supra note 13, at 2-3.
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intermediaries could lead consumers through the ESIS in a way that impedes the
ability of the consumer to glean the information they need to determine whether
the loan terms are consistent with what they had been promised, whether the loan
is on the approved standard form of home loan products, the risk classification of
the loan, and whether the loan terms are suitable for the consumer. For this reason,
it is critical that before a borrower enters into a very risky home loan, he or she
first be required to receive independent advice on it from a certified-as-trained
mortgage counselor who complies with the advice standards that the Commission
establishes.
V.

CONCLUSION

The EU Commission, as noted, seems poised to create a Directive that would
mandate the disclosure of key loan terms and expenses to EU consumers before
they enter into a home loan. Providing this disclosure in the form of the Revised
ESIS with the modifications we have detailed here, including a standard and broad
based method of calculating the APRC, would provide consumers with a very
necessary and useful tool to shop for the most suitable loan and enhance the
efficiency of the home loan market. However, due to various cognitive and social
psychological phenomena described in Section II, the revised mandatory ESIS
alone will not adequately protect consumers from entering into risky or otherwise
unsuitable home loans. In this article, we proposed four additional measures to be
included in the Directive to address these psychological phenomena: (i) the
creation of an approved standard form of prudent home loan product, and a
disclosure in the revised ESIS of whether the offered product complies with that
standard; (ii) the creation of a risk based classification system for the home loan
products being offered among the EU Member States and a disclosure of the
classification of the home loan product being offered in the revised ESIS; (iii)
imposing a duty of "suitability" on mortgage lenders and credit intermediaries to
ensure that the loans they are offering are affordable, provide a net economic
benefit, and do not reflect great price disparities; and (iv) requiring mandatory
counseling advice from an independent, certified-as-trained mortgage counselor if
the consumer is entering into a home loan product classified as very risky.
The four reforms were designed to provide necessary protections to
consumers with minimal added costs and minimal loss of autonomy for both
consumers and providers of loans. Indeed, the first two proposed reform measures
do not mandate that the lender offer or that the borrower accepts any specific type
of loan or loan term. Instead, like the revised ESIS, they simply provide important
information to the consumer (whether the offered loan qualifies as meeting the
requirements of a standard form of prudent home loan and the risk classification
level of the loan product offered). While the third reform measure - imposing a
duty of suitability on the mortgage lender or credit intermediary - would limit the
type of loan terms and loan products lenders can offer to borrowers, the duty
should be set at a level where a rational borrower ex ante would not choose to enter
into a loan with such terms or features. The fourth reform measure, mandating
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counseling by an independent, trained mortgage counselor before entering into
certain home loans does in fact restrict the borrower's autonomy (being forced to
receive some advice on the loan from an independent source), but we have
reserved this reform for only home loans with features that would cause the loan to
be classified as very risky - one that only a minority of rational borrowers would
ex ante choose to take. Furthermore, the costs for the counseling should be kept at
a low statutorily set maximum, similar to what Illinois has enacted for its high-risk
home loans.213
Creating, implementing, and monitoring compliance with the four proposed
reforms will create costs primarily imposed on the EU Member States, rather than
on consumers or lenders. In order for the Commission to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis of these reform measures for the Member States, the Commission will
need to obtain not only estimates of these costs, but also better data on how well
the home loan market is currently functioning without these reforms (including
obtaining statistics on price disparities and loan default rates), as well as the
economic benefits these reforms are likely to create. Ultimately, these reforms will
benefit consumers by ensuring that they enter into lower cost and less risky loans,
leading to fewer loan defaults. It is also in the interest of members of the financial
industry to, at the very least, embrace the first two reform measures we propose, as
implementation of these two measures may be a necessary precondition to
successfully marketing cross-border home loans to consumers. These two reforms
can significantly raise the confidence level of consumers, allowing them to feel
protected when they are presented with a cross-border home loan that has been
certified as being in compliance with the ESIS's standard form of prudent home
loan or when the loan offered reflects a low level of risk rating in the ESIS. As
these benefits will encourage both consumers and lenders to transact cross-border
home loans, these reforms should be viewed as an essential step in achieving the
Commission's primary goal of enhancing the integration of the EU mortgage
market, which in turn should lead to improvements in the economies of all
Member States.2 14

213. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70.
214. The Commission projected a substantial positive impact on the economies of the
Member States from enhanced integration of the EU mortgage market. Green Paper,supra note
3, at 3.
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